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TAXING INDIRECT TRANSFERS: IMPROVING AN
INSTRUMENT FOR STEMMING TAX AND LEGAL
BASE EROSION
Wei Cui*
Numerous countries (e.g., Canada, Australia, and Japan) tax foreigners
on the gains realized on transfers of interests in foreign entities that invest
directly or indirectly in real estate in those countries. In the last few years,
actions taken by tax authorities in India, China, Brazil, Indonesia, and other
non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries have highlighted the possibility of taxing a broader range of
indirect share transfers by foreigners. This article argues that taxing indirect
transfers can have vital policy significance in countries where foreign
inbound investments are actively traded in offshore markets: it not only
deters tax avoidance, but may also stanch legal base erosion - the
substitution of offshore investment structures for legal mechanisms in
onshore markets. The successful implementation of a broad policy of taxing
indirect transfers, however, depends crucially on securing voluntary
taxpayer compliance. To this end, this article proposes to rationalize
existing practices for taxing indirect transfers in two major ways: (1)
striking a better balance between ex ante and ex post lawmaking; and (2)
consistently treating taxable indirect transfers as sales of underlying target
companies (thus allowing conforming adjustments in tax basis). These
improvements better target tax avoidance, eliminate arbitrary consequences,
and generate market incentives that facilitate compliance.
* Associate Professor, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law. Vancouver,
British Columbia, Canada. I have benefited from opportunities to present versions of this
paper at the International Tax Center at Leiden University, the Melbourne Office of Sullivan
and Cromwell, and the Harvard Law School Seminar on Current Issues in Tax Law, Policy,
and Practice, and from comments by Hugh Ault, Peter Blessing, D.P. Sengupta, and Steve
Shay. All mistakes remain my own.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A fascinating recent development in the world of international taxation
is the adoption by several major non-OECD countries, including India,
China, Indonesia, and Peru, among others, of a policy of taxing foreigners
on the sale of interests in foreign entities that hold assets indirectly in these
654 [Vol. 33:653
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countries.' In September 2007, Indian tax authorities notified the U.K.-
based multinational telecommunications company Vodafone that the
acquisition, by a Vodafone Dutch subsidiary, of the shares of a Cayman
company from the Hong Kong telecom conglomerate Hutchinson was
taxable in India, because the acquisition was made for the purpose of
acquiring the Indian telecommunications businesses indirectly owned by
the Cayman Islands Company. Vodafone challenged the notice in Indian
courts and, after a protracted legal battle that was widely watched by the
global tax community, won a favorable verdict from the Indian Supreme
Court in January 2012.2 The drama only escalated at this point. The Indian
legislature responded to the ruling by adopting general legislation,
purported to have retroactive effect back to 1962, that embodies a policy of
taxing indirect transfers (i.e., via the transfer of interests in foreign entities)
of the shares of Indian companies.3 Offering fewer courtroom and
legislative spectacles, but attracting no less attention from the international
business community, China has pursued a similarly controversial policy of
taxing indirect share transfers after the issuance of an informal piece of
administrative guidance4 in December 2009." As other countries join India
1 India's and China's policies for taxing indirect share transfers are discussed in detail
in Parts IV through V, infra. For Peruvian practice, see Latin America News Alert, Peru,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (Feb. 22, 2011), available at http://www.publications.pwc.com/
DisplayFile.aspx?Attachmentid=4267&Mailinstanceid=19687 (stating that indirect transfers
of shares in Peruvian entities owned by a foreign companies are taxable if the foreign
company holds assets over fifty percent of the fair market value of which comprises the
shares of a Peruvian entity). For Indonesian practice, see Dwi Ary Retnani, Presentation on
Developments in International Anti-avoidance in Asia Pacific at Asia-Pacific Regional Tax
Conference, Singapore (Apr. 2, 2013) (on file with author). Brazilian tax authorities also
displayed a willingness to tax abusive indirect transfers in a 2009 case. Pedro Vianna de
Ulh6a Canto & Antonio Luis H. Silva, Jr., Brazil, 34 TAX MGMT. INT'L FORUM, no. 2, June
2013, at 14.
2 News reports and writing by practitioners on the Vodafone case in India are
voluminous. See, e.g., D.P. Sengupta, Vodafone, in TAX TREATY CASE LAW AROUND THE
GLOBE (M. Lang et al. eds., 2012); Vispi T. Patel & Rajesh Athavale, The Vodafone
Controversy: International Ramifications of Where Gain Accrues On the Transfer ofShares,
INT'L TRANSFER PRICING J., July/Aug. 2009, at 244-54; Jack Grocott, Vodafone Wins $2.5
Billion India Battle, INT'L TAX, REV., (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.internationaltaxreview
.com/Article/2964952/Vodafone-wins-25-billion-India-battle.html (citing overwhelming
response by practitioners in favor of the Indian Supreme Court's decision and, by
implication, against the Indian tax administration). Nonetheless, few scholarly or policy
analyses of the case have emerged.
3 See Draft Report on Retrospective Amendments Relating to Indirect Transfer,
Expert Committee (2012) (India) [hereinafter Shome Report], available at http://www.
incometaxindia.gov.in/archive/DraftReport 10102012.pdf.
4 Guojia Shuiwu Zongju Guanyu Jiaqiang Fei Jumin Qiye Guquan Zhuanrang Suode
Qiye Suodeshui Guanli De Tongzhi (g A Th$i
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and China by adopting similar practices, 6 a policy trend seems to be
emerging. Some interpret the trend as evidence that developing countries
are beginning to define new norms of international taxation that deviate
significantly from the norms championed by the OECD and its member
countries.7
In truth, the intuition behind taxing indirect transfers by foreigners of
domestic assets and the shares of domestic companies is exceedingly
simple, transparent even to the laymen once explained, and in some limited
ways already accepted by policymakers and tax professionals around the
world. Numerous OECD countries (e.g., Canada, Australia, and Japan,
among others) already implement such a policy with respect to narrower
categories of assets such as domestic real estate.8 The concept of taxing
indirect transfers of real estate is even enshrined in the capital gains articles
of both the OECD and U.N. Model Tax Conventions. 9 Nonetheless, the
11PM'HAWITR791) [Notice on Strengthening the Administration of Enterprise Income
Tax on Gain Derived from Equity Transfer Made by Non-resident Enterprise] (promulgated
by the State Administration of Taxation, Dec. 10, 2009, effective Jan. 10, 2008) Guo SHUI
HAN [2009] No. 698 (China) [hereinafter Circular 698]. Specific aspects of the circular are
discussed infra Parts III through V.
5 Practitioners writing on Circular 698 have been similarly voluminous as writing on
the Vodafone case in India, while academic or policy analysis is equally lacking. See, e.g.,
Lawrence Sussman et al., China's Controversial New Disclosure Rule, 2009 WORLDWIDE
TAX DAILY 241-1 (Dec. 18, 2009); Jinji Wei, China Receives Single Largest CGT Payment
From Indirect Share Transfer, 2010 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 123-1 (June 28, 2010)
(discussing a tax imposed on a U.S. company for an indirect transfer of shares in a Chinese
resident company through a wholly owned Hong Kong subsidiary); Jinji Wei, Goldman
Sachs Facing Chinese Tax Investigation for Indirect Stock Transfers, 59 TAX NOTES INT'L
635 (Aug. 30, 2010).
6 See Latin America - Tax Consequences of Indirect Share Transfers, KPMG, (Aug.
23, 2013), http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/taxnews
flash/pages/latin-america-tax-consequences-indirect-share-transfers.aspx (discussing policies
of taxing indirect transfers in Chile, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Peru). Moreover,
the practices of many (especially non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD)) countries of taxing indirect transfers may simply not be well known.
7 The International Fiscal Association, the largest international organization of tax
professionals, has planned a special session on taxing indirect asset transfers for its 2014
annual meeting to be held in Mumbai, India. See Seminar Topics, IFA INDIA 2014, http://
www.ifa2014mumbai.com/ws/index.php/business-program/seminar-topics (last visited Apr.
22, 2014).
8 See the discussion of relevant rules in Canada, Japan, and Australia, infra Part IV.
9 U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L EcoN. & Soc. AFFAIRS, U.N. MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION
CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES art. 13, U.N. SALES No.
E.12.XVI.1 (2011) [hereinafter U.N., MODEL CONVENTION]; ORG. FOR EcON. COOPERATION
& DEV., MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL art. 13 (2012) [hereinafter
OECD, MODEL CONVENTION].
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policy of taxing indirect transfers of domestic assets seems easy to describe
initially, but difficult to come to full terms with subsequently. Even after
exposure to the concept for decades, the attention of the international tax
and business communities still seems to linger on the notion that indirect
transfers may be taxed, while discussions of how indirect transfers should
be taxed have barely begun. As this article will show, the actual practices
for taxing indirect transfers, even those adopted by countries with otherwise
sophisticated systems of business income taxation, remain remarkably
crude.10 There is a concern, therefore, that developing countries are now
eagerly embracing what is in substance an old and stagnant idea.
This article suggests that this sense of stagnation is ultimately
unwarranted and can be attributed to two causes. First, policymakers have
typically considered taxing indirect transfers either only in the abstract (e.g.,
when drafting provisions for model tax conventions) or in reaction to
perceived tax avoidance in specific countries. They have not reflected, more
generally, on when indirect transfers are likely to be pursued for purposes of
tax avoidance. Additionally, because the factors that determine the
prevalence of indirect transfers may vary from country to country and even
during different periods for the same country, a shared sense of the urgency
or importance of taxing indirect transfers has never developed. Second, the
core difficulty for a policy of taxing indirect transfers is enforcement. Even
countries with developed systems of tax administration have neither fully
settled on the tools for enforcing the tax nor ascertained the actual levels of
compliance. Much of the developing countries' enthusiasm for the policy
may therefore eventually be undermined by under-enforcement and
noncompliance, which legal and tax advisors in different markets may have
little incentive but to acquiesce in.
Once we confront these two issues directly, however, the appearance of
stagnation falls away. This article argues that designing better rules for
taxing indirect transfers has vital policy importance for two reasons. First,
we need to take a step back from tax policy and recognize that the
prevalence of indirect transfers by foreigners of domestic assets with
respect to a given jurisdiction depends on whether there is an active
offshore market for foreign investments into that jurisdiction. The choice of
indirect transfers as a tax avoidance device is generally complementary to
the choice of an offshore market for carrying out investment activities. In
turn, whether an active offshore market for foreign investment exists for a
given country depends on many aspects of the country's markets and legal
system. Understanding this point allows us to appreciate not only that some
countries' decision to tax indirect transfers need not be a matter of taking a
10 See infra Parts IV-V.
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"more aggressive" stance than others that do not, but also that taxing
indirect transfers may have benefits beyond deterring tax avoidance. This
article highlights an important class of cases in which active offshore
markets have emerged for nontax reasons, and in which these offshore
markets divert resources away from the development of onshore legal
systems. In these cases, a policy of taxing indirect transfers can be viewed
also as a way of taxing their complement - the use of offshore markets.
The tax may serve as a tool to prevent not only tax avoidance and tax base
erosion, but also what one might call legal base erosion;' 1 it can help bring
market resources back onshore, into building legal systems in real
economies.
Second, the difficulty of enforcement implies that the best way to
implement the tax on indirect transfers is by improving voluntary
compliance. An important step towards that goal is rationalizing the rules
for taxing indirect transfers: if the rules produce too many arbitrary
consequences and are perceived as irrational, they may drive tax avoidance
behavior into the sphere of outright evasion. This article recommends
several major modifications of the existing rules adopted by both developed
and developing countries for taxing indirect transfers. For example, most
countries that have adopted bright-line rules should consider narrowing the
scope of such rules, while relying on tax authorities' power of making ex
post determinations to deal with taxpayers who try to game the bright-line
rules. Moreover, all countries should consider adopting an approach that
treats a taxable indirect transfer of shares as an asset sale, with consequent
adjustments of and conformity among the tax cost or basis of the underlying
target company's shares and the basis of the shares of offshore holding
companies. This method would produce more rational tax consequences
than does the conventional approach, which treats the shares of each
offshore holding company as independently taxable. As this article shows,
such rationalization should improve compliance.
The article proceeds as follows. Part II explains the intuition for taxing
indirect transfers and poses a puzzle: why do we not observe the practice of
taxing indirect transfers more often around the world? Part III considers the
various reasons why the use of indirect transfers poses problems for tax
policy in some countries but not in others, contrasting two extreme cases,
foreign investments in U.S. real estate and in China. I will argue that the
choice of indirect transfers as a tax avoidance device is likely to be
complementary to a more basic decision to use the offshore market for
making investments. Part IV discusses how the frequency of indirect
transfers might affect the choice of the form of law for taxing them,
1 See infra Part VII for a specification of the idea of "legal base."
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particularly whether rules or standards are more appropriate.12 1 Will
contrast actual practices for taxing indirect transfers in light of this
dichotomy and suggest that a better balance in the use of rules and
standards can be struck. Part V analyzes methods for rationalizing the
consequences of taxing indirect transfers and shows that many problems
encountered under the approach taken by India, Canada, and other countries
can be avoided under the Chinese approach, which purports to treat all
taxable indirect transfers as transfers of the underlying Chinese companies'
shares. By combining the analyses in Parts IV and V, one arrives at a
method of taxing indirect transfers that is superior in many aspects to all
existing practices. Part VI then demonstrates how rationalizing the rules for
taxing indirect transfers can improve compliance. Finally, Part VII
examines the broader policy objectives of a tax on indirect transfers -
beyond discouraging avoidance of a tax on direct transfers. Part VIII
concludes.
II. WHY Do WE NOT OBSERVE TAXATION OF INDIRECT SHARE TRANSFERS
MORE OFTEN?
Many countries tax the capital gain, realized by residents and
nonresidents, on the sale or disposition of assets located within their
borders. Many of them also subject the transfer of shares or equity interests
in domestic entities (e.g., partnerships, corporations, et cetera) holding such
taxable assets to the same tax on capital gain. There is a fundamental
connection between these two practices: if the sale of business entities is
not taxed, then the tax on sales of (other) assets can often be avoided simply
by having business entities hold such (other) assets and selling the entities
instead. It has indeed been argued that much of the complexity of business
entity taxation is attributable to the need to tax both asset sales and share
sales,13 while at the same time to avoid over-taxing assets held by entities. 14
The idea that an entity may be formed simply to avoid the tax on the
transfer of assets invites two obvious extensions. First, it is not enough to
12 Part III discusses the distinction between rules and standards drawn in Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J. 557 (1992).
13 I will speak generally of taxing the transfer of shares, but the reference to shares can
be understood broadly as including any type of equity interest in an entity.
14 See David A. Weisbach, The Irreducible Complexity of Firm-level Income Taxes:
Theory and Doctrine in the Corporate Tax, 60 TAX L. REV. 215 (2007), especially Part III.
David Weisbach develops this argument generally, regardless of whether corporate
distributions are subject to tax: the necessity of taxing share sales is thus unrelated to the
imposition of tax on both the corporation and its shareholders under the classic corporate
income tax. A fortiori, the character of the firm holding the taxable asset - whether it is a
corporation, partnership, or some other form - also does not matter.
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tax the transfer of shares of an entity that directly holds a taxable asset (i.e.,
an asset the gain accruing to which would, in the first instance and without
regard to the issue of tax avoidance, be taxable). To prevent easy tax
avoidance, one must also tax the transfer of shares of entities that
themselves hold taxable shares. The tax on share sales must be made
recursive. Second, it is not enough to tax just the shares of domestic
entities, especially if nonresidents are to be subject to tax on gains realized
on assets. The transfer of shares of foreign entities that hold taxable assets
must also be taxed, lest the simple imposition of a foreign entity defeats the
goal of taxation. This tax on the transfer of shares of foreign entities must
also be made recursive.
The recent policies pursued by India, China, and other countries thus
seem only to follow what is logically inevitable: since these countries
generally tax foreigners on the gain realized on the transfers of the shares of
domestic companies,' 5 they would surely want to prevent tax avoidance that
uses offshore holding companies formed to hold the taxable shares. The
solution is to tax foreigners on the transfer of foreign entities, if such
entities hold (directly or indirectly) taxable shares of domestic companies.
For our purposes in this article, this is what "taxing indirect transfers"
means.
Until recently, however, the idea of taxing indirect transfers has been
considered only infrequently in international tax practice. Although the
capital gains articles of both the OECD and U.N. Model Tax Conventions
afford the authority to tax nonresidents on both the capital gain realized on
the disposition of immovable property located domestically and the gain
realized on the disposition of the shares "deriving more than 50 per cent of
their value directly or indirectly from [such] immovable property,"l 6 only a
small number of countries appears to have enacted domestic laws to impose
such a tax. 17 Perhaps as a result of this, many tax treaty specialists view the
15 For India, see The Income Tax Act, No. 43 of 1961, INDIA CODE § 9(1)(i) (1993).
For China, see Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Suodeshui Fa Shishi Tiaoli
( [Regulations on the Implementation of
Enterprise Income Tax Law] (promulgated by the St. Council Gaz., Dec. 6, 2007, effective
Jan. 1, 2008) art. 7 (China).
16 OECD, MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 9, art. 13, § 4; see also U.S. DEP'T OF
TREAS., MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, art. 13, § 2 (2006) [hereinafter TREAS., MODEL
CONVENTION] (setting forth a similar provision); U.N., MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 9,
art. 13, § 4, cl. b (same). These provisions all permit the country where the immovable
property is located to tax the sale of shares of foreign entities that are possibly formed to
avoid taxes on their underlying real estate assets.
1 See discussion of related rules in Canada, Japan, and Australia, infra Part IV. Tax
treaties typically limit the taxing power of countries that enter into the treaties: what is not
taxable under domestic law would not become taxable merely because the tax treaties permit
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specific rules for implementing the tax treaty provisions regarding indirect
transfers of immovable property as insufficiently worked out.18 There is
thus a strong contrast between the apparent conceptual inevitability of a
policy of taxing indirect transfers, on the one hand, and the apparent
infrequency with which countries actually do adopt such policies, on the
other. If entities can be formed with ease to avoid taxes on direct transfers
by nonresidents, why do we not observe rules for taxing indirect transfers
more often?
Pointing to this question as a puzzle by no means implies that we
should expect to see a tax on indirect transfers as a universal phenomenon.
A significant number of countries, as a matter of tax policy, simply do not
tax capital gain realized on investment assets by residents or nonresidents. 19
Even in countries that do tax capital gain realized by residents, taxation of
nonresidents may be regarded as special from an enforcement perspective.
When assets in country A, or the shares of a company resident in country A,
are transferred by a foreigner (including, often, to another foreigner) and the
transferor is made liable for tax, the tax authority in country A may have
difficulty not only to detect the transaction, but also to collect tax from the
foreign transferor if the latter does not pay the tax voluntarily. The cost of
enforcement against a foreigner would be significantly higher than the cost
of enforcement against domestic taxpayers. This has discouraged some
countries from taxing nonresidents on the sale of shares of domestic
companies.20 Broadening the tax net against foreigners by taxing indirect
transfers is obviously even more ambitious.
It is important to acknowledge here another possible explanation for
the fact that many countries do not tax foreign investors on the capital gain
realized by selling shares of domestic corporations. There is a familiar
taxation.
18 Letter from Jacques Sasseville, Head, Tax Treaty Unit, Fiscal Affairs Division,
OECD (on file with author); see also infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
19 Examples of tax avoidance through indirect transfers are not limited to income
taxation, however; indirect transfers can be a technique to avoid stamp duties and other
transfer taxes as well. For instance, many Hong Kong holding companies that are shell
companies (deployed to take advantage of the tax treaties that Hong Kong has entered into in
recent years) have themselves shell companies in the Virgin Islands or the Cayman Islands
as parents. The reason is the Hong Kong stamp duty imposed on the transfer of shares of
Hong Kong companies: investors who want the option to exit through share sales intend to
avoid the Hong Kong stamp duty by selling the Virgin Islands (or Cayman) parent's shares
instead.
20 This was a major reason why the United States abandoned taxing nonresidents on
capital gain realized on the sale of U.S. securities in 1936. See Stanford G. Ross, United
States Taxation ofAliens and Foreign Corporations: The Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966
and Related Developments, 22 TAX L. REV. 277, 293-95 (1967).
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argument that the tax on share sales is needed to back up the tax on
dividends: if there was no tax on share sales, it would be possible for
shareholders to realize the value of retained earnings but avoid the dividend
tax by selling shares. 21 This argument thus ties taxing share sales to the
"classical" corporate income tax system (i.e., where income accruing to a
corporation is taxed both when earned by the corporation and when
distributed as dividends). By implication, if a country has abandoned the
"classical" corporate income tax, for example, in favor of some way of
integrating the taxation of corporate income at the entity and shareholder
levels, then there is even less justification for taxing share sales. In recent
decades, many countries in Europe and elsewhere (mostly OECD countries)
have indeed stopped taxing both dividends paid to, and capital gains from
share sales made by, foreigners. 22
For the purpose of this article, it is readily admitted that those countries
that do not tax the sale of shares of domestic companies by foreigners
would a fortiori not be interested in taxing indirect share sales. A broader
perspective, though, reveals at least two reasons why it nevertheless
remains puzzling that taxation of indirect share transfer is not more
prevalent. First, the justification for taxing share sales does not have to rest
with the classical corporate income tax.23 I have already offered an
alternative, and fundamental, justification for the policy at the beginning of
this part, namely to prevent tax-deferral planning whereby taxpayers
contribute assets expected to appreciate into a business entity and sell the
21 For a recent argument along this line for taxing share sales by foreigners investing in
U.S. companies, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Money On the Table: Why the U.S. Should Tax
Inbound Capital Gains, 63 TAX NOTES INT'L 41 (July 4, 2011). It should be pointed out that
although tax practitioners are keen to point to the possibility of arbitraging between dividend
and share sale if one is taxed but not the other, the design of many corporate tax systems
contradict the assumption that these are close substitutes for each other. For example, it is
common to see tax systems (e.g., in United States and Canada) that exempt inter-corporate
dividend distributions but that do not exempt corporations from tax on capital gain realized
on the sale of shares. See I.R.C. §§ 61, 243; Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1, §§ 3, 112
(Can.). Conversely, it is common to see countries enforcing taxes on dividends paid to
foreigners (and maintaining significant dividend tax rates) while at the same time exempting
foreigners from capital gain on share sales (again, the United States and Canada are
examples). See I.R.C. §§ 861, 871, 888; Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1, §§ 212, 248(1).
22 This may reflect either an intention to moderate the effects of the classical corporate
income tax, or a policy of "promot[ing] an 'orderly,' non-discriminatory residence-based tax
system" within a framework of international coordination (e.g., within the European Union),
or both. Harry Huizinga, Commentary to Alan J. Auerbach et al., Taxing Corporate Income,
in DIMENSIONS OF TAx DESIGN: THE MIRRLEES REVIEw 895 (Inst. for Fiscal Studies ed.,
2010); see also id. at 894-903 (discussing this possibility in greater detail).
23 Again, as observed supra note 19, other taxes, such as the stamp duty face, problems
of avoidance created by indirect transfers.
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entity tax-free. This justification is valid even with respect to the sale of
interests in noncorporate entities and is entirely independent of the system
of corporate income taxation. It is true that those countries that do not tax
share sales by foreigners do not seem compelled by this justification,2 4 but
there is no a priori reason why they should not be. Put differently, there is
no a priori reason to believe that preventing the systematic deferral of tax
liability is an insufficient justification for the policy of taxing share sales,
even if such policy may not be compelling in particular circumstances.
The second reason why policies of taxing share sales (direct or
indirect) should not be summarily dismissed (especially by those in OECD
countries) is that there is no a priori reason even to believe that a tax on
share sales within a "classical" corporate income tax system is unjustified.
A traditional policy justification for the corporate income tax itself is that it
allows a given country to tax foreigners on economics rents earned in that
country.25 Yet in many developing countries, that the appreciation of
foreigners' investments in domestic companies has to do with special
opportunities in the local economy can be an undeniable fact.26 Taxing such
gain can thus be justified straightforwardly as a matter of taxing location-
specific rent.27 Such a view may certainly stand in contrast to perspectives
from OECD countries, where it is now common to argue that corporate
residence is largely a matter of legal form, and to argue that "sourcing" to
that corporation's state of residence the gain that has accrued to the shares
of a corporation is consequently also formalistic. Both views may be correct
in specific circumstances, and neither is universally or even predominantly
valid.
The foregoing discussion of a well-known debate regarding tax policy
is not meant to justify conclusively a policy of taxing foreigners on share
sales, but only to establish that there is no prima facie case against such
taxation. This is just to say that we can assume that many (especially non-
24 Still, it is possible that the difficulty of enforcing a tax against foreigners is a key
consideration.
25 See Auerbach et al., supra note 22, at 872; Huizinga, supra note 22, at 901; Jack M.
Mintz, Commentary to Auerbach et al., supra note 22, at 907.
26 That is, firm shares may appreciate not because of accrued earnings, but because of
improved prospects for future return.
27 If one can identify underlying assets that generate location-specific rents (e.g.,
exclusive licenses to operate telecommunication networks within a particular country), then
the taxation of indirect transfers may be justified even without any reference to a tax
avoidance motive: the shares of any company, anywhere in the world, that derive their value
from that specific instance of economic rent may be taxed by that country, were this
administratively feasible (and if appropriate measures are taken to avoid cumulatively high,
i.e., greater than 100 percent at the extreme, tax on the same rent). I am grateful to Steve
Shay for this point.
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OECD) countries that in fact tax share sales by foreigners are justified in
adopting that policy. This brings us back to the puzzle raised earlier: all of
the justifications for taxing direct share sales by foreigners should also
justify the taxation of indirect share transfers. From this perspective, it is
the customary practice of not taxing indirect transfers that is pizzling.
The rest of this article suggests a solution to the puzzle, in the
frequency with which indirect transfers occur with respect to a given
jurisdiction. It turns out that three issues are interconnected: the frequency
of indirect transfers, how indirect transfers are taxed, and how such a tax is
enforced. The frequency of indirect transfers may obviously determine
whether a country needs to design rules for taxing indirect transfers in the
first place. It will also affect whether those rules should operate ex ante or
only ex post. The greater the frequency of indirect transfers, the greater
need there is for ex ante determinations. In turn, whether rules for taxing
indirect transfers can be applied ex ante, and whether they are designed to
produce rational consequences, have crucial implications for the choice of
enforcement tools and the taxpayers' incentives to comply. To trace these
connections, we start with the question: what determines the frequency of
indirect transfers?
III. WHEN Do TAX-AVOIDING INDIRECT TRANSFERS OCCUR?
The United States offers an interesting example for analyzing the
policy of taxing indirect transfers. The United States does not generally tax
foreigners on the gains realized on the sale or disposition of shares of U.S.
companies. 28 Since 1984, however, the United States has, under the Foreign
Investment in Real Property Tax Act (FIRPTA) provisions of the federal
income tax,29 subjected foreigners to a high tax - generally thirty-five
percent at the federal level - on any gain realized on the disposition of any
U.S. real property interest (USRPI), including the shares of U.S. real
property holding companies (USRPHCs) (essentially U.S. companies with
substantial U.S. property holdings).30 This FIRPTA tax is enforced by
28 This is initially the result of a Congressional view in 1936 that taxing transfers of
U.S. company shares by foreigners is administratively difficult, see Ross, supra note 20, and
has perpetuated until today largely due to the long-standing policy of attracting foreign
portfolio investment in the U.S. See David R. Sicular & Emma Q. Sobol, Selected Current
Effectively Connected Income Issues for Investment Funds, 56 TAx LAw. 719, 725-27
(2003).
29 I.R.C. §§ 897, 1445.
30 Before the enactment of the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act
(FIRPTA), foreigners were able to avoid tax on the disposition of U.S. real estate assets not
just by putting such assets into a U.S. corporation, but also by relying on the general utilities
doctrine to obtain a basis step up in the assets even when the corporation is liquidated and
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requiring U.S. transferees of USRPIs (including the shares of USRPHCs) to
withhold from the gross proceeds paid to foreign transferors, and by
requiring the transferors to file federal income tax returns to report FIRPTA
gain.31 Over the years, the Department of the Treasury and the Internal
Revenue Service (Service) have adopted extensive regulations to lay out the
details for implementing FIRPTA,32 coordinating it with a large number of
provisions in other parts of the Internal Revenue Code. As an important part
of U.S. tax policy towards foreign investments in the United States,
FIRPTA law and regulations have obtained a reasonably high degree of
compliance (at least with their literal terms) from taxpayers and tax advisors
alike, even though well-known techniques exist to reduce the effective tax
burden under FIRPTA.33 Insofar as the direct transfers by foreigners of
shares of USRPHCs are concerned, therefore, the United States has
developed a system of law and administration for enforcing a (high) tax that
is arguably as respectable and "serious" as one can find anywhere in the
world.
Nonetheless, the United States has made no attempt to tax nonresidents
on gains realized on the transfers of foreign companies that themselves hold
USRPI (including USRPHC shares).34 Consequently, in theory, foreigners
can escape the FIRPTA tax on gain simply by forming offshore holding
companies that hold USRPIs, or otherwise structuring their investments so
that the main return on the investments takes the form of (untaxed) gain on
the sale of the shares of such foreign entities.
Remarkably, for all intents and purposes, this is simply not done. There
is no significant trading of USRPI through offshore transactions, so there is
no readily available opportunity for tax avoidance by using them.35 This
phenomenon has received little commentary from U.S. tax practitioners,
and therefore one cannot easily point to an explanation of the phenomenon
that can be said to draw wide consensus. Yet one plausible explanation is
perhaps sufficiently compelling. The most active and lucrative market for
USRPIs has always been in the United States itself For sellers of USPRIs,
the most likely and most desirable buyers, throughout the recent decades,
has been U.S. persons. There may be both tax and nontax explanations of
sold. See Alan L. Feld, Is FIRPTA (Partially) Obsolete?, 35 TAX NOTES 607 (May 11, 1987).
31 I.R.C. § 1445.
32 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.897-1 to -9T, 1.1445-1 to-I IT (1988).
33 See generally David J. Herzig, Rethinking FIRPTA (Oct. 12, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2163146.
34 This is not on account of any concern with extra-territoriality. The United States has
long imposed a tax on dividends paid by foreign companies that derive a substantial amount
of "effectively connected income." I.R.C. § 861(a)(2)(B).
35 This claim is based on my observations while in professional practice.
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this phenomenon. Previous scholarship has suggested that U.S. investors
may have a tax-based comparative advantage over foreign investors (both
individual and corporate) in investing in U.S. real estate.36 Putting tax aside,
given the size and level of development of the U.S. economy, and assuming
"home bias" on the part of both U.S. and foreign investors, et cetera, it
should not be surprising that U.S. investors dominate in U.S. real estate
market. For such persons, it is obviously inefficient to hold USRPI through
foreign corporations. Foreign companies holding FIRPTA assets are subject
to both corporate-level tax and withholding tax on the return they realize
from U.S. property, all of which can be avoided by U.S. persons when they
hold U.S. real property interests through partnerships or other pass-through
entities. 37 In addition, U.S. persons are generally taxed on their worldwide
income, including capital gain realized on the sale of foreign corporations. 38
There is thus no advantage to routing U.S. investments offshore. When U.S.
investors dominate foreign investors in investing in U.S. real estate, we can
therefore expect that the tax-based preferences of U.S. investors for onshore
transactions dictate the result that an offshore market for USRPI is nearly
nonexistent.
In summary, although foreign investors should have very strong
incentives to avoid FIRPTA tax on their U.S. real estate investments (since
the tax rate is high), and although the Service has taken substantial
measures to maintain the integrity of the FIRPTA tax regime and ensure
adequate compliance with withholding and reporting requirements, neither
side has given much thought to tax avoidance through the use of foreign
companies that invest in USRPIs. The United States has thus not followed
Canada, Australia, and Japan, which (as discussed subsequently) have
enacted special rules for taxing indirect transfers of Canadian and real
properties located in these countries. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that this can
be interpreted as evidencing weaker interest on the part of the Service to
protect the U.S. tax base.
It is instructive to contrast the U.S. example with that of another large
single economy: China. For more than twenty years, there has been an
36 See Michael S. Knoll, Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign Wealth
Funds: Do Taxes Encourage Sovereign Wealth Funds to Invest in the United States?, 82 S.
CAL. L. REV. 703, 742-44 (2009).
3 I.R.C. §§ 882, 897. Moreover, by holding U.S. assets through U.S. and not foreign
entities, U.S. persons can make use of a large variety of tax rules, relating to depreciation,
loss carry-forward and carry-back, group consolidation, et cetera, to lower the effective tax
burden on the returns of a single U.S. investment. Any offshore holding company used by
foreigners to avoid FIRPTA, by contrast, is likely to isolate investments in U.S. real property
interests through special purpose vehicles.
3 See L.R.C. § 61.
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active offshore market for foreign direct investments (FDIs) into China -
indeed, it is the market for FDIs with which international law firms and
high-end Chinese legal service providers are most familiar.39 Moreover, it
is these providers' preferred market, compared to the onshore markets of
mergers, acquisitions, and stock listings.40 Some of the most widely
discussed Chinese regulatory developments targeted at FDIs in recent years
sought to regulate this offshore market.4 1 Given the liquidity of this market,
even though the tax on capital gain on the transfer of Chinese company
shares by foreign entities is only ten percent, the tax was regarded as
optional except for a minority class of cases42 before China's State
Administration of Taxation adopted Circular 698, which penalizes abusive
instances of indirect transfers of Chinese company shares. 43
Why is there such an active offshore market for FDIs into China?44
Traditionally, the answers given by practicing lawyers are that FDIs are
3 Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP, Using a Chinese Entity for an All-foreign
Joint Venture in China - Does It Make Sense?, CHINA LAW & PRAC., May 2005.
40 See generally HOWARD CHAO ET AL., O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, ONSHORE
FINANCIAL INVESTING IN CHINA (2011), available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6963/
WhitePaper onOnshoreInvestments.pdf.
41 See, e.g., Guojia Waihui Guanli Ju (M A^f#[ })) [Notice of the State
Administration of Foreign Exchange on Printing and Distributing the "Operating Rules for
Foreign Exchange Administration Concerning Financing and Round-trip Investment by
Domestic Residents Through Overseas Special-Purpose Companies"] (promulgated by the
St. Admin. of Foreign Exchange, May 20, 2011, effective July 20, 2011, repealed May 30,
2013), HUI FA 19 (China) (updating guidance regarding reporting obligations of Chinese
residents for foreign currency transactions arising from offshore holding entities and
referring to a series of previous guidance on the same subject); Guanyu Waiguo Touzi Zhe
Binggou Jingnei Qiye De Guiding () JiJ [Provisions on
Foreign Investors' Merger with and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises] (promulgated
jointly by the Ministry of Commerce, State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission of the State Council, State Administration of Taxation, State Administration for
Industry and Commerce, China Securities Regulatory Commission, and State Administration
of Foreign Exchange, Aug. 8, 2006, effective Sept. 8, 2006) (China) (adopting extensive
provisions regarding reporting requirements for offshore mergers and acquisitions with
respect to Chinese assets).
42 These include types of foreign direct investments in China where the foreign
investor must satisfy certain eligibility requirements. For example, only a foreign insurance
company can set up an insurance subsidiary in China, thus no foreign-invested insurance
company in China can have a mere holding company as a parent.
43 See Circular 698, supra note 4, f 5, 6.
4 This question really has to be answered in two parts, because the sellers and buyers
in the offshore market can be either foreign or Chinese. One question is whether Chinese
investors prefer the offshore market to the onshore market. The second is whether, and why,
foreign investors prefer it. The answer to the first question is straightforward: the majority of
Chinese investors probably do not prefer the offshore mergers and acquisitions market.
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subject to substantial Chinese government regulation,45  and the
organizational laws regarding foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) are much
less flexible than the organizational laws of traditional offshore holding
company jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands, the Virgin Islands,
Bermuda, and Hong Kong.46 Investors naturally would prefer to minimize
unnecessary engagement with regulators and to attain an adequate level of
flexibility in the governance and financing of their investments. As far as
merger and acquisitions activities with respect to FDIs into China are
concerned, however, these answers have never been fully satisfactory and
have become less so in recent years. First, many crucial regulatory
requirements applicable to FDIs into China - e.g., compliance with
China's industrial policy, foreign exchange requirements (which, among
other things, limit the capital structures of FIEs), and so on - cannot be
avoided simply by adding layers of holding companies in offshore
jurisdictions. Foreign investors have to deal with these core regulatory
requirements regardless of the offshore structures they adopt.47 Second, it is
true that offshore structures remove many types of commercial dealings
(e.g., shareholder agreements) from China's jurisdiction. Insofar as these
dealings do not contravene Chinese government policies, however, the
disadvantage of subjecting them to the review of Chinese regulators is
mainly a matter of coping with red tape. For example, Chinese regulatory
requirements for mergers and acquisitions with respect to FIEs are largely
procedural and not substantive. 48 Subjecting oneself to such red tape may
not always be unacceptable to foreign investors, and may indeed be
worthwhile if the payoff is exposure to a more active merger and
acquisition market and more efficient onshore structures. Third, it is also
unclear whether Chinese organizational law is really unacceptably
inflexible, unsophisticated, and unpredictable. China has tried to borrow
from advanced jurisdictions in designing its corporate and partnership laws,
Because China still has a capital control regime, the percentage of Chinese individuals and
entities that are able to accumulate funds outside China and participate in offshore mergers
and acquisitions is still relatively small. Like the United States, the onshore market in China
is much more densely populated with sellers and buyers. Thus Chinese sellers and buyers of
Chinese investments come to the offshore market mainly in order to accommodate foreign
buyers or sellers. The crucial question therefore is why foreign investors would not prefer to
buy and sell on the thicker, onshore markets.
45 See generally DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL, ch. 10 (2009).
46 See generally Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP, supra note 39.
47 See CHAO ET AL., supra note 40.
48 See Regulations on Merger and Divisions of Foreign-invested Enterprises
(promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and the State
Administration for Industry and Commerce) WAI JING MAO FA FA 395 (1999) (China).
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and there is a clear tendency towards having less regulation and greater
flexibility in organizational law. 49 There is also a growing body of
corporate litigation,5 0  generating potentially useful interpretations of
Chinese corporate and commercial law (even if they are still largely
neglected by international firms and most FDI lawyers). By contrast, the
Cayman Islands, the Virgin Islands, Bermuda, and even Hong Kong, unlike
Delaware, actually do not boast of strong organizational law to guide
merger and acquisition activities (or courts for enforcing them).5 1
Considerations of the structure of the market for legal services for FDIs
into China suggest a fuller explanation. Like numerous other countries,
China regulates the market for legal services and prohibits international
firms from practicing Chinese law. 52 As a result, most international law
firms practicing in China lack Chinese law expertise and generally are ill
prepared to pursue innovation in Chinese law.53 It is very much in the
interest of these law firms to push transactions to offshore jurisdictions with
generic and minimalist corporate laws, since executing such transactions
would not require jurisdiction-specific legal expertise. It is very much in the
interest of such firms to portray Chinese regulatory and corporate law as
unsophisticated and inflexible, and any approach involving regulatory
approval as a dead-end. In other words, it may be the legal advisors
themselves, and not necessarily their clients, who prefer the paths of least
resistance that mindlessly wind through the Cayman Islands and the Virgin
Islands of the world. Insofar as these international firms succeed in keeping
49 See, e.g., China Relaxes Capital Requirements for Some Firms to Cut Red Tape,
REUTERS, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/19/china-reforms-capital-idUSL3NOLO
0G720140219 (Feb. 18, 2014); Li Jiabao & Zhao Yinan, Foreign Investment Laws Will Be
Revised, CHINA DAILY, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-04/14/content_17431891.
him (last updated Apr. 14, 2014, 11:09AM).
50 See, e.g., Nicholas C. Howson, Judicial Independence and Company Law in the
Shanghai Courts, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW
PROMOTION 134-53 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2009).
51 See, e.g., Tony Freyer & Andrew P. Morriss, Creating Cayman As an Offshore
Financial Center: Structure & Strategy Since 1960, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1297, 1360 (2013)
(noting that the Cayman Islands had to hire judges from other jurisdictions to form its Court
of Appeals in the 1980s because "no Caymanian has the qualifications probably at this time
to sit on that Court" (quoting James Bodden)).
52 See Mark A. Cohen, International Law Firms in China: Market Access and Ethical
Risks, 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 2569 (2012).
5 The Chinese-law-related transactional experience of many lawyers in such firms
typically comprises only setting up offshore structures and foreign investment enterprises
(FIEs) in China and handling the disposition of shares of the FIEs or offshore companies.
Asset sales and purchases, mergers and spin-offs, and other corporate transactions that are
reasonably active in China lie beyond these lawyers' skill set. Refined knowledge of Chinese
corporate and contract law is rare.
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their foreign clients away from competing Chinese law firms and insofar as
the Chinese law firms, partly as a result, do not find sufficient rewards for
legal innovations in the onshore market, transactional options in China may
remain limited. In other words, the regulation of legal services may be as
important a culprit for the under-development of the onshore market for
foreign investors as are the regulations on corporate and FDI activities in
general.
I do not claim that the foregoing two examples - foreign investment
in U.S. real estate and FDI into China - are typical of cross-border
investments around the world. They were chosen merely to illustrate the
idea that there may be systematic reasons why indirect transfers pose a
problem of tax avoidance in some jurisdictions and not others. This idea
sheds light on the puzzling fact that there seems to be not much more than a
dozen examples around the world of attempts at taxing indirect transfers of
domestic assets by nonresidents. 54 We may speculate that, generally, for
foreign investments into each target jurisdiction, there are what one might
call centripetal and centrifugal forces that push investment structures
alternatively onshore and offshore. Centripetal forces that attract foreign
investors onshore include an active onshore market thickly populated with
domestic parties (who typically would find offshore structures for investing
in their own jurisdictions inefficient) and facilitated by an effective legal
regime for mergers and acquisitions.5 5 When such forces dominate, tax
avoidance through indirect transfers will often not be commercially
attractive. Centrifugal forces, by contrast, include unfriendly (and easily
avoidable) domestic regulatory regimes and undeveloped law for mergers
and acquisitions, as well as comparatively lower quantities of domestic
parties in the onshore mergers and acquisitions market. When these forces
prevail, the synergies among them and the motive of tax avoidance will
encourage the practice of indirect transfers. It is mainly in those
circumstances that maintaining the integrity of a tax on the capital gain
accrued to onshore assets requires taxing indirect transfers.
Of course, extensive offshore structures for foreign investment into a
target jurisdiction are often the result of features - intended or unintended
- in the tax law of the target jurisdiction itself. The exemption of foreign
investors from taxation on dividends and capital gains, commonly practiced
54 See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
5 They may also possibly include high onshore income tax rates, which increase the
tax benefits of depreciation deductions and basis step up generally, and therefore accentuate
the attraction of asset deals as opposed to share deals. The prevalence of active onshore
buyers with sophisticated tax profiles (e.g., corporate consolidation, loss carryover, et cetera)
may also be relevant.
670 [Vol. 33:653
Taxing Indirect Transfers
in Europe, 56 facilitates and encourages structures with stacks of holding
companies. A permissive attitude toward, or at least ineffective enforcement
against, tax treaty shopping also famously spawns offshore structures. For
countries that do not tax capital gains realized by nonresidents or that
willingly condone treaty shopping and other forms of base erosion,57 taxing
indirect transfers would serve no policy purpose. Only countries that do not
adopt such policy stances face the problem of taxpayers' abusive use of
offshore structures.
This speculation, and the two examples in support of it, are illustrative
of the general idea that whether a particular type of tax planning or
avoidance technique is adopted depends on whether such techniques are
compatible with other aspects of market practices.58 One way of describing
this phenomenon is to say that tax-planning techniques are complementary
goods to more basic transactional choices that market participants make. 59
If the demand for offshore market activities decrease, the demand for tax
planning involving offshore transactions would surely also decrease. The
complementarity between offshore markets and offshore tax planning and
avoidance suggests a perhaps more provocative idea than the concept of
frictions for tax planning: where a "frictionless" offshore market has
developed mostly for nontax reasons, for example, to circumvent the real or
perceived difficulties of an onshore market, and where such an offshore
market as a secondary matter facilitates tax avoidance and erodes a
country's tax base, a country's attempt to tax activities in that offshore
market can generate frictions for avoidance maneuvers with respect to non-
tax law. To the extent that the offshore market is socially not optimal (e.g.,
that it suppresses the development of the onshore legal regime), an attempt
to tax activities in that market may have positive effects aside from
protecting the tax base. I will explore this idea further in Part VII.
More immediately, I will turn in the next part to the idea that the
frequency of indirect transfers that potentially contain a tax avoidance
56 See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
5 See ORG. FOR EcON. COOPERATION & DEV., ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT
SHIFTING (2013), available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/addressing-base-
erosion-and-profit-shifting_9789264192744-en (formally enshrining the base erosion
concept).
5 This idea has been explored in previous scholarship that highlights the fact that high
transactional costs (frictions) of all varieties may defeat tax avoidance schemes. See, e.g.,
David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1312
(2001). Whether a market exists at all for certain transactions that would serve tax planning
or avoidance purposes (e.g., sales of offshore companies holding onshore assets) can
certainly raise one type of barrier or "friction" for tax planning or avoidance.
59 Basic examples of complementary goods are half-and-half to coffee, hotdog buns to
hotdogs, et cetera. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF EcoNoMics 70 (6th ed. 2008).
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component has implications for the design of rules combating such
avoidance. Sometimes, even where rules for taxing indirect transfers are
appropriately enacted, the infrequency of such transfers may render the
enforcement or elaboration of the rules a low priority. Conversely, the
frequent occurrence of indirect transfers dictates that, from a social
perspective, anti-avoidance rules with regard to such transfers must be
designed in particular ways.
IV. Ex ANTE V. Ex POST DETERMINATIONS OF TAXABILITY OF INDIRECT
TRANSFERS
A number of scholars have recently hypothesized that the "extent of the
market" may predict how likely legal rules are to emerge. 60 The idea is that
a greater volume of social activities will more likely justify the fixed social
cost of designing rules governing such activities and of creating
mechanisms for propagating and implementing such rules.61 More
influentially, it has been argued from a normative perspective that the
greater frequency with which a certain type of behavior takes place in a
society, the more likely it is that it would be socially optimal to specify the
content of rules regulating such behavior (if regulation is desirable) in
advance, or ex ante. 62 Specifying the content of legal rules before relevant
behavior takes place may generate a greater upfront social cost in designing
appropriate legislation. Nonetheless, it will save later costs, incurred both
by regulated subjects in trying to determine the content of law applicable to
particular anticipated behavior, and by those responsible for enforcing the
law. Moreover, because ex ante legislation, by lowering the costs of
subsequent determinations of the content of law, may produce greater
compliance by some regulated subjects. The more frequently transactions of
a given type requiring regulation take place in a society, therefore, the more
likely it is that ex ante lawmaking is preferable to ex post lawmaking from a
social perspective.63
These seemingly academic ideas can shed a surprising amount of light
on the real-world practices of taxing indirect transfers and current
60 See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis, Law-making in Small Jurisdictions, 56 U. TORONTo L.J.
151 (2006); Casey B. Mulligan & Andrei Shleifer, The Extent of the Market and the Supply
of Regulation, 120 Q.J. EcoN. 1445 (2005).
61 See generally Davis, supra note 60; Mulligan & Shleifer, supra note 60.
62 Kaplow, supra note 12; David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-tax-
avoidance Doctrines, 4 AM. L. & EcoN. REv. 88 (2002).
63 The distinction between ex ante and ex post lawmaking is captured in (one
understanding of) the dichotomy between rules and standards. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note
12; see also Weisbach, supra note 62 (applying this distinction in the tax avoidance context).
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controversies about them. Often, countries that tax indirect transfers of real
properties located in them have not hesitated to formulate the relevant rules
in simple, bright-line terms that did not require extensive interpretation. For
example, Canada taxes nonresidents on taxable income derived from the
disposition of "taxable Canadian property," 64 including the shares of
foreign corporations that, at any particular time during the sixty-month
period before the disposition, derive more than fifty percent of the fair
market value of their shares "directly or indirectly" from real or immovable
property situated in Canada or certain other Canadian property. 65 Taxpayers
themselves can determine the shares of which foreign corporations
constitute "taxable Canadian property." Similarly, Australian tax law
provides that foreign residents would be liable for Australian capital gains
tax (CGT) in relation to "taxable Australian property." 66 "Taxable
Australian property" is defined to include direct or indirect interests in
Australian real property,67 and an indirect Australian real property interest
will exist where a foreign resident has an equity interest which passes a
"non-portfolio interest" test and a "principal asset" test.68 Again, such
provisions allow nonresidents to self-assess whether a taxable transfer of
indirect Australian real property interest has occurred. Japanese provisions
for taxing indirect transfers of real property interests are similar in
character. 69
India's new policy for taxing a broader range of indirect transfers has
been formulated along the same lines. In the 2012 amendment of the
Income Tax Act of India, the Indian legislature provided that "any share or
64 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1, § 2(3)(c) (Can.). For a discussion, see Elie S.
Roth, Canada, in TAXATION OF COMPANIES ON CAPITAL GAINS ON SHARES UNDER DOMESTIC
LAW, EU LAW AND TAX TREATIES 479-558 (Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2013).
6' R.S.C. 1985, c. 1, § 248(1).
66 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, s 716.855 (Austl.). For a discussion of these
provisions of Australian tax law, see Ken Spence & Richard Shaddick, New CGT Exposures
and Exemptions for Non-residents, Taxation institute of Australia, 22d National Convention
(Mar. 17, 2007) (on file with author). I am grateful to Mr. Brendan Sullivan of Level 10
Selborne-Wentworth Chambers for directing me to the primary and secondary sources on
Australian tax law in this and the following footnotes.
67 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, s 855.15.
68 Id. s 855.25. The nonportfolio interest test is passed if the direct participation
interests held by the foreign resident and its associates in the test entity is in the aggregate
ten percent or more. The principal asset test is passed when more than fifty percent of the
value of the test entity's assets is attributable to Australian real property.
69 See Order for Enforcement of the Corporation Tax Act, Cabinet Order No. 96 of
1965, art. 177, para. 2. cl. iv (Japan); id. art. 187, para. 1, cl. iv; id. art. 187, para. 8. I am
grateful to Professor Yoshihiro Masui for guiding me to information on this aspect of
Japanese tax law. See also Yuko Miyazaki, Japan, 34 TAX MGMT. INT'L FORUM, no. 2, June
2013, at 50-3.
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interest in a company or entity registered or incorporated outside India shall
be deemed to be . . . situated in India, if the share or interest derives,
directly or indirectly, its value substantially from the assets located in
India."70 Therefore, the transfer of such shares would result in the
realization of income accruing or arising in India and taxable to a
nonresident transferor.71 It has been proposed that "substantially" be
defined to mean fifty percent or more of the total value of a company's
assets. 72
In contrast with these examples of what one might call the
"conventional" approach for taxing indirect transfers, China determines the
taxability of an indirect transfer on the basis of an ex post determination.
Under Circular 698, in cases where an offshore investor makes abusive uses
of organizational forms 'or arrangements indirectly to transfer the equity
interest in a Chinese resident enterprise, and such arrangements are without
a reasonable business and entered into to avoid enterprise income tax
obligations, tax agencies are authorized to recharacterize an equity transfer
according to its business substance and disregard the existence of the
offshore holding company that is used for tax planning purposes. 73 That is,
only a tax authority can determine the taxability of an indirect transfer, and
such determination is to be made explicitly on the basis of a finding of tax
avoidance motives. Chinese tax practitioners have generally attributed the
legal authority for Chinese tax agencies to make such determinations to the
general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) in China's Enterprise Income Tax
Law,74 since the policy of taxing indirect transfers otherwise lacks statutory
basis. 75 This attribution is appropriate 76 insofar as Circular 698's approach
70 The Income Tax Act, No. 43 of 1961, INDIA CODE § 9(1)(i), explanation 5 (as
amended by Finance Act, 2012).
71 See Shome Report, supra note 3, § 3.1, .5.
72 Id. § 4.3.
7 Circular 698, supra note 4, 6.
74 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Suodeshui Fa (
A'II'fij~fAa) [Law on Enterprise Income Tax] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
People's Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) art. 47 (China). ("Where an Enterprise
makes other arrangements without a reasonable commercial purpose, resulting in reduction
of the amount of its taxable income or income, the tax authority shall have the right to make
reasonable adjustments thereto."). An arrangement "without a reasonable commercial
purpose" has been defined as one "where the main purpose is reduction, exemption or
deferral of tax payments." Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Suodeshui Fa Shishi Tiaoli
( [Regulations on the Implementation of
Enterprise Income Tax Law] (promulgated by the St. Council Gaz., Dec. 6, 2007, effective
Jan. 1, 2008) art. 120 (China).
7 Circular 698 is an informal piece of administrative guidance. See Wei Cui, Foreign
Administrative Law and International Taxation: A Case Study of Tax Treaty Implementation
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is consistent with the application of GAAR as generally and internationally
understood, i.e., the tax consequences of a transaction are determined after
the fact, and the result of applying specific, ex ante applicable rules to the
transaction may be overturned if an overall review of the facts and
circumstances dictate a contrary result.
This novel aspect of China's approach 77 - that the taxability of
indirect transfers can be determined only after the facts of the indirect
transfers have been fixed - has been somewhat obscured by another aspect
of Circular 698, which requires foreign transferors of shares of companies
that are formed in certain "suspect" types of jurisdictions7 8 and that hold,
directly or indirectly, the shares of Chinese companies, to report the
transfers to Chinese tax authorities. 79 Under current Chinese domestic tax
law, this reporting requirement technically lacks legal basis, and many
Chinese tax practitioners as well as tax administrators have come to view
the "requirement" as not legally compulsory.80 One does not need to grasp
the esoteric details of Chinese tax law to appreciate why this might be the
case: if the taxability of an indirect transfer can be determined only by the
tax authority after the review of all relevant facts and circumstances, before
in China, 64 ADMIN. L. REv. 191, 201-03 (2012).
76 Circular 698 does not itself cite the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) as its
statutory authority. Nor does it cite certain general guidelines for making GAAR
investigations and adjustments promulgated earlier by China's State Administration of
Taxation. See Tebie Nashui Tiaozheng Shishi Banfa (Shixing) (0f] iwJEr'
E (itti~)) [Implementing Measures for Special Tax Adjustment (Trial)] (promulgated
by the State Administration of Taxation, Jan. 8, 2009, effective Jan. 1, 2009) Guo SHUI HAN
[2009] No. 2 (China). Under this earlier guidance, tax authorities may apply GAAR to deal
with abuses of tax preferences, tax treaties and the corporate form, and the use of tax havens
and other arrangements without a reasonable business purpose. Id. art. 92. Tax agencies are
to adopt a substance-over-form approach in investigating abusive transactions. Id. art. 93.
Entities without business substance may be disregarded. Id. art. 94.
7 India has considered but has deferred the adoption of a GAAR in its tax law. If and
when adopted, the GAAR may be deployed to deal with Vodafone-like cases without using
the rule that deems capital gains from indirect transfers to be Indian-source. Letter from D.P.
Sengupta, former Chief Comm'r of Income Tax of India, to Wei Cui (Feb. 2013) (on file
with author); see also supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
7 These are jurisdictions that either impose a corporate income tax rate lower than
twelve and one-half percent or exempt foreign-source capital gain from tax for resident
companies. Circular 698, supra note 4, 5.
7 Id.
so See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Suodeshui Fa (
xli~fty@ h) [Law on Enterprise Income Tax] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
People's Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) art. 7 (China). For an analysis, see
Wei Cui, The Unauthorized Decision to Tax Indirect Equity Transfers in China, 2 DIRITTO E
PRATICA TRIBUTARIA INTERNAZIONALE 1075 (2010).
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such a determination is made, the foreign transferor may have derived no
Chinese-source income, and therefore the jurisdictional basis for imposing a
reporting requirement may be lacking. As I will discuss more generally in
Part VI, when the taxability of indirect transfers is determined on an ex post
basis, there may generally be legal obstacles to imposing reporting and
(more importantly) withholding requirements for purposes of enforcing the
tax. Other mechanisms may therefore be needed to produce compliance.
Before exploring the subtler implications of China's ex post approach
for taxing indirect transfers, some more obvious contrasts with the
conventional, bright-line, ex ante approach require comment. Two general
contrasts pertain, in order, to the scope of taxable transactions under each of
the two approaches and to the cost of making determinations about
taxability.
A. The Scope of Taxable Transactions
Since the rules adopted by Canada, Australia, Japan, India, et cetera
characterizing taxable indirect transfers do not make any reference to a tax
avoidance motive, 8 1 they can subject more transactions to tax than is
necessary for the purpose of anti-avoidance. That is, relative to the goal of
preventing tax avoidance through the making of indirect transfers, these
rules seem overly broad and insufficiently targeted. 82 One of the long-
standing complaints about taxing indirect transfers of real property - as
permitted under article 13(4) the OECD Model Tax Conventions - is that
the foreign investor may be a member of a corporate group in its home
country and the execution of corporation reorganizations within the home
country could trigger a tax on indirect transfers in another country where a
real property investment is located.8 3 It is felt that "innocuous" intra-group
1 See generally sources cited supra notes 66-71.
82 This is not to dispute that it has been commonly accepted that countries have the
right (in terms of international law) to tax indirect share transfers, blunt as such a tax
instrument might be. Another possible response to this critique is that a country's rules for
taxing the sale of shares of foreign companies that hold substantial real estate in the country
need not be motivated by anti-avoidance concerns. It is simply based on the view that
companies (domestic or foreign) that derive their values substantially from real estate in the
country are as fair a target for taxation as the real estate itself. Yet it is unclear how (1) this
view should not apply more generally to non-real-estate assets as well, and (2) countries that
do tax indirect transfers can be so nonchalant about the problems of multiple taxation, see
infra Part V.A, if they actually view foreign and domestic companies' shares as equally fair
to tax.
83 See OECD, MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 9, art. 13 cmt. on § 28.7 at C(13)-l l.
Currently, both Indian and Chinese tax authorities are being heavily lobbied to introduce an
exemption in their respective policies for taxing indirect transfers within corporation
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transfers within one country should not trigger a tax in another country
where some investment assets happen to be located. 84 Of course, many
indirect transfers, not just those involving corporate reorganizations, may be
said to be "innocuous" by some standards for judging the existence of tax
avoidance. Another example is the transfer of a company that is listed on a
major stock exchange. If the relevant standard for tax avoidance is whether
an arrangement has business substance, then a company listed on a
recognized stock exchange seems to possess ample business substance,
even if such company has no or few employees, no assets other than shares
of subsidiaries, and no operations of its own. If a listed company were not a
meaningful nexus of contracts among managers and shareholders,
shareholders and creditors, or among shareholders themselves, there would
be no point in regulating the listing of companies. It seems implausible to
consider a listed company as a mere device for avoiding the tax on direct
transfers.8 5
Yet this point is for the most part not recognized under the
conventional approach for taxing indirect transfers. 86 For example, Canada
appears to regard the taxability of the transfers of shares of a listed foreign
company as a matter of administrability. Shares of a corporation listed on a
designated stock exchange are generally exempt from the tax on indirect
transfer, unless the nonresident (together with non-arm's-length persons)
owned twenty-five percent or more of any class of the capital stock of the
corporation at any time in a five-year look-back period. 87 In relation to such
substantial shareholders, the fact that a listed company is unlikely to serve
the main purpose of facilitating the avoidance of the tax on direct transfers
is given no weight.
reorganizations. See Shome Report, supra note 3, § 4.8.
84 Since corporate reorganizations benefit from deferral treatment under the income tax
systems of a number of countries, some taxpayers accustomed to such treatment may feel
disappointed if a tax on indirect transfer is triggered by a host country of an investment.
Nevertheless, the momentum for treaty-based coordination to ensure that corporate taxpayers
obtain deferral treatment for reorganizations simultaneously in different jurisdictions has
been weak. This is perhaps not surprising in light of the weak policy justification for deferral
treatments of corporate reorganizations generally.
85 See Shome Report, supra note 3, § 4.7 (recommending that India exempt shares of a
company frequently traded on a recognized stock exchange from the tax on indirect
transfers, on the ground of both administrability and that such a company "should not be
considered as a shell or conduit company.").
86 Contra TREAS., MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 16, art. 13, § 2(c) (excluding from
the category of taxable real property interest "shares in which there is regular trading on a
stock exchange.").
87 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1, § 248(1) (Can.) (definition of "Taxable
Canadian Property," subparagraph (e)).
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By contrast, the ex post approach, which rests the taxability of an
indirect transfer on the finding of a tax avoidance motive, is inherently
better-targeted at tax avoidance - if it can be reliably applied. Thus the
Chinese policy of taxing abusive indirect transfers potentially covers a
much narrower range of transactions than other recent efforts (e.g., by India
and Peru) to tax indirect transfers of resident companies' shares. The main
question is whether the open-ended criteria proposed by Circular 698 (i.e.,
an "abusive use of organizational forms," an absence of reasonable business
purpose, and a motive to avoid tax) can be consistently applied. Taxpayers
and tax advisors in China have complained about such criteria being "vague
and unclear."88 If that complaint simply points to the difficulty of applying
the criteria ex ante, it goes to a fundamental characteristic of a standard (as
opposed to a rule). One might also counter by asking whether those
taxpayers and advisors would instead prefer many indirect transfers be
made categorically taxable, as they are under Indian law. Presumably, the
answer is no. The real issue then is whether a rule for taxing abusive
indirect transfers can be designed to be both narrowly tailored and
predictable.
B. The Costs ofDetermining Taxability
One salient problem with China's current approach for taxing indirect
transfers - although not one that tax advisors are heard often to complain
about - is that it leaves the question of taxability unnecessarily open.
Indirect transfers of shares of Chinese companies occur quite often, since
the preferred market for trading investments into China is located
offshore. 89 As also discussed earlier, it is unclear whether the offshore
market thrives really because of unacceptable red tape and inflexibility
associated with Chinese regulators and/or the backwardness of Chinese
corporate and commercial law, or instead, because international law firms,
prohibited from developing expertise in Chinese law, prefer to direct clients
offshore because these firms are most advantaged there. 90 What is clear is
that many of the entities used in offshore structures for investing into China
simply reflect investors' preference for the path of least legal resistance and
neither serve substantial functions nor display a bona fide, operational
business purpose. As a result, many parties carrying out indirect transfers
88 See, e.g., WHITE & CASE, CHINA TAX BULLETIN (Feb. 2010), available at http://
www . whitecase.com / files / Publication / flOObfb6 - 16b2 - 4da3 - bcf6 - 5603978ba23d /
Presentation/ PublicationAttachment/ 6b087381-05cl-42b6-8fff-5b0c83b23657/China Tax
Bulletin February 2010.pdf.
89 See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
90 See supra Part III.
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that face potential scrutiny under Circular 698 are likely hard-pressed to
define business purposes for their offshore holding companies (and have
probably been surprised by their Chinese tax advisors' suggestions about
what flimsy claims of business purposes might be accepted by Chinese tax
authorities). In this context, the determination that many of the holding
companies serve no genuine business purpose, or that whatever business
purpose they serve pales in comparison to the potential tax savings an
indirect transfer could secure, can be made in a much more routine fashion
than Circular 698's case-by-case examination permits. 91 More streamlined
determinations can be made, perhaps at the expense of little loss of fairness
or accuracy.
There are anecdotal reports of a backlog of "Circular 698 cases" across
China, in which foreign entities have reported indirect transfers already
carried out and prepared to make tax payments, but kept waiting
indefinitely by local tax authorities who have yet to make the determination
that the transfers are taxable. This phenomenon exactly fits the theory cited
at the beginning of this part regarding the cost structures for implementing
law in the form of either rules or standards. When transactions of a certain
type occur with sufficient frequency, it is socially inefficient for the law
applicable to such transactions to be couched in terms of standards as
opposed to rules. Enforcement officials, regulated subjects, and legal
advisors all need to incur costs in working out the content of a standard
applicable to each transaction. The aggregate costs of these efforts can be
significantly reduced if the content of law is set out in the form of a rule
with easily determinable content. Given the frequency of indirect transfers
of Chinese investments, if China wants to tax such transfers, the law for
imposing such a tax should be formulated to a greater extent as ex ante
applicable rules. If that remains not done, inefficient tax administration and
low degrees of compliance may follow as a consequence. 92
Furthermore, over-reliance on legal standards, such as those associated
with GAAR, for combating tax-avoidance may create too many
opportunities for negotiation between taxpayers and authorities. Since
taxpayers typically deploy significantly greater resources than tax
authorities (e.g., taxpayers derive better support from legal and tax
advisors), it has been plausibly suggested that the odds may be stacked
91 See Circular 698, supra note 4, 1 6.
92 The reason that a higher cost (inherent in the use of a standard as opposed to a rule
for formulating law) for determining the content of applicable law to particular transactions
may lead to less compliance is that some subjects may decide not to acquire legal advice or
otherwise learn about the content of law because of the high cost. See Kaplow, supra note
12, at 577-78.
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against tax authorities in such negotiations. 93 While the tax authority can be
"tough" in some particular cases, it may not have the resources to follow
through with its "tough" stance in most cases. This hypothesis has
unfortunately been borne out by the implementation of Circular 698 in
China in the last few years. An industry of tax advisors on Circular 698 has
emerged, whose routine tool of trade is to persuade foreign parties that have
made indirect transfers to hire them to report such indirect transfers (even
though the reporting "requirement" under Circular 698 is not legally
compulsory),94 and to pay them literally to "negotiate" with Chinese tax
authorities about the taxability of the transfers, sometimes regardless of
whether the position of nontaxability has any merit.
C. Striking a Better Balance ofEx Ante and Ex Post Devices Against Tax
Avoidance
From this comparison, it should be obvious that room exists for
improvement for all existing practices of taxing indirect transfers -
located along the dimension of ex ante and ex post law-making, between
the conventional approach for taxing indirect transfers (traditionally applied
only where foreign investment in domestic real property is concerned), and
the approach China adopted under Circular 698. On one extreme, if a tax
authority, for purposes of preventing tax avoidance, were to make a
complete specification of which indirect transfers are taxable ahead of time
without retaining any power to make a determination ex post, it might
understandably err toward over-inclusiveness. Yet as the examples of home
country reorganizations and of a transferred company that is traded on a
recognized stock exchange show, the bright-line rules adopted by several
countries for taxing indirect transfers can be manifestly over-broad.95 That
over-breadth creates two kinds of problems. First, when tax authorities try
to combat tax avoidance by taxing indirect transfers of a broad range of
foreign investment in domestic assets, the error of over-breadth is greatly
magnified and becomes hard to neglect. The policy of taxing indirect
transfers becomes unnecessarily controversial.96 Second, rules justified on
the ground of anti-avoidance that are obviously ill targeted create greater
incentives for ignoring the rules. As a result, tax authorities are likely under
93 Weisbach, supra note 62, at 107.
94 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. As discussed in Part V, however,
incentives may be created for parties to report indirect transfers through the proper design of
basis adjustment rules, even in the absence of an effective legal requirement for reporting.
95 See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
96 See, e.g., supra note 2 and sources therein.
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pressure to devote greater resources to enforcement in order to maintain
credibility for their anti-avoidance efforts.
A superior approach seems to be specifying a narrower scope of
taxable indirect transfers through rules that taxpayers can themselves apply,
while reserving to tax authorities the power to apply an anti-avoidance
standard after the fact. China's grounding of the taxability of indirect
transfers on a criterion of business substance (or lack thereof) is an example
of the use of the latter power.97 Nonetheless, when a standard is the only
guidance regarding which indirect transfers may be taxable, it may turn out
to be too weak a tool to achieve optimal compliance. Specifically, that is a
context in which presumptively taxable indirect transfers likely occur with
greater frequency than tax authorities have the resources to monitor
unilaterally under an open-ended anti-avoidance standard. Taxpayers and
tax advisors are likely to exploit such governmental weaknesses by
engaging in socially wasteful tax planning to create smoke and mirrors
masking tax avoidance ex ante and by negotiating favorable tax outcomes
ex post. In such a context, it is more sensible to devise specific anti-
avoidance rules describing transactions that are highly likely to lack
business substance and that make such transactions per se taxable. In the
meantime, it would also make sense to offer safe harbour provisions (e.g.,
for listed companies) describing transactions that are either categorically or
presumptively nontaxable.
Although the policies regarding taxable indirect transfers of real estate
assets in OECD countries like Canada, Australia, and Japan have the
inconspicuous air of settled law, a question that has remained unanswered is
how well they are enforced. This question, however, is likely to be crucial
for countries like India and China that attempt to tax a broader range of
indirect transfers to combat tax avoidance. This is because offshore markets
for investments into these countries are likely to be much more active, and
because the capacity for tax administration in these countries are more
limited. Poorly designed rules that encourage noncompliance and/or
wasteful tax planning may well defeat the countries' anti-avoidance efforts.
The next part shows that there is another aspect of the conventional
approach for taxing indirect transfers that is likely irrational and which
irrationality becomes magnified when a broader range of indirect transfers
is subject to tax.
9 Circular 698, supra note 4, 6.
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V. THE "SOURCE" V. "LOOK-THROUGH" APPROACHES TO TAXING
INDIRECT TRANSFERS
A. The Conventional Approach and the Problem ofMultiple Taxation
An important aspect of the conventional approach for taxing indirect
transfers is that transfers of shares of foreign entities by nonresidents are
treated as giving rise to items of per se taxable income: any capital gain on
such transfer is explicitly stipulated to have a domestic source. Take Canada
for an example. If foreign company A derives more than fifty percent of the
fair market value of its shares directly or indirectly from real or immovable
property situated in Canada, then the shares of A constitutes "taxable
Canadian property." 98 Suppose now that A is wholly owned by another
foreign company, B, and B has no assets other than A's shares. The shares
of B would also constitute "taxable Canadian property." Any capital gain
realized on the disposition of B's shares is therefore also taxable income in
Canada, and is legally distinct from the capital gain that has accrued to or
been realized on A's shares. If Canada has taxed the capital gain on the
disposition of the shares of A (by B), that does not prevent the capital gain
realized on the disposition of the shares of B (by B's shareholder) from
being taxed in Canada (or vice versa). There is obvious irony in this, if
taxing indirect transfers is motivated by the policy of anti-avoidance.
Presumably, the reason why, in order to protect a source country's ability to
tax the capital gain realized on the transfer of its domestic assets, indirect
transfers at indefinitely many layers "above" the domestic assets must be
taxed, is that such additional layers may not represent anything of economic
substance. The approach just described (which we might call the source
approach), however, essentially treats each such layer as creating a new
taxable asset for the source country.
Interestingly, neither the governments of Canada, Australia, and
Japan, nor the bodies responsible for the Commentaries on the OECD and
U.N. Model Tax Conventions99 have been sufficiently perturbed by the
consequences of this choice.100 In the case of the OECD countries, one
might conjecture that this is because indirect transfers by foreigners of
98 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1, § 2(3)(c) (Can.).
99 See U.N., MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 9, art. 13, cl. 4 (providing for the
taxation of indirect transfers of real estate assets by the source country where such assets are
located); OECD, MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 9, art. 13, cl. 4 (same).
100 It may be noted that under section 897 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code), the
entire capital gain on a sale of the shares of a U.S. real property holding company
(USRPHC) is also taxable to a foreigner even if only fifty percent of the USRPHC consists
of U.S. real property interests. See I.R.C. § 897(a)(1), (c)(2).
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domestic real property are insufficiently frequent (because of either the
narrowness of the asset class or the absence of an active offshore market for
that asset class) to make concerns about anomalies arising from the source
approach too pressing. Recent policy debates in India about the taxation of
a broader range of indirect transfers have highlighted many problems with
that approach, however. For example, an Indian expert committee report on
indirect transfer (the Shome Report) recommends taxing any gain realized
on a taxable indirect transfer under a principle of "proportionality," i.e.,
only in proportion to the value of the Indian assets relative to the entity's
global assets.101 As noted by the Shome Report, the OECD and U.N.
Models do not suggest such proportional taxation in connection with
transfers of real estate assets by the source country where such assets are
located. 102 Nor have the OECD countries practicing the source approach
adopted it. 103 Thus, if the shares of non-Canadian company A derive only
fifty percent of their fair market value from Canadian real property, all of
the capital gain realized on the sale of A shares is taxable in Canada.104 An
equally arbitrary consequence is the multiple taxation of the same economic
gain, as the example of the shares of companies A and B in the previous
paragraph illustrates. In the Indian context, the Shome Report recommends
mitigating this problem with respect to transfers of investments in offshores
entities that are regulated "foreign institutional investors"105 by exempting
those transfers. 106 The problem remains, however, in a variety of other
scenarios.
Are governments justified in their indifference about the problem of
multiple taxation of the same economic gain in taxing indirect transfers?
One argument in the affirmative is that the decision of how many layers of
1o1 Shome Report, supra note 3, § 4.3. This is still different from taxing the gain on the
transfer only to the extent attributable to gain realized on the underlying Indian assets.
102 Id. § 4.13; see generally U.N., MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 9, art. 13, cl. 4;
OECD, MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 9, art. 13, cl. 4.
103 See, e.g., supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
104 For objections to similar consequences under Australian rules for taxing indirect
share transfers of Australian real estate assets, see Spence & Shaddick, supra note 66, at 7.
'os Id. § 4.9. The fact that these foreign institutional investor (FII) entities, which
actively trade in the Indian securities market, are registered with and regulated by India's
securities exchange regulator suggests that they are unlikely to be formed primarily for tax
avoidance purposes. Taxing transfers of interests in such entities may thus be an instance of
the over-breadth of the conventional approach for taxing indirect transfers criticized in Part
III. That may be the more important argument for exempting indirect transfers of interests in
FIs, and not multiple taxation: many of the Fls are formed in jurisdictions (e.g., Mauritius
and Singapore) whose treaties with India prevent the latter from taxing capital gain realized
on direct trades in Indian companies' shares. Letter from D.P. Sengupta, supra note 77.
106 Shome Report, supra note 3, § 9.
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intermediate companies are interposed between the domestic asset and
ultimate investors is in the control of the taxpayers, as are decisions to make
dispositions at different levels. If governments are wary of convoluted and
opaque offshore structures to begin with, they have no reason to go out of
their way to make sure that tax is neutral with respect to the choice of
organizational structure in offshore corporate groups.' 07 While this
argument is probably correct in itself, there is an important competing
consideration. As discussed in Part II (and more fully in Part VI below),
taxing foreigners on both direct and indirect share transfers raises
significant challenges for enforcement: when tax authorities have to
actually enforce tax collection against foreign taxpayers as opposed to
relying on voluntary compliance, the cost of enforcement is likely to be
much higher than for domestic taxpayers. If the tax on indirect transfers
leads to arbitrary tax consequences because of unmitigated multiple
taxation, however, taxpayers may respond not by simplifying offshore
corporate structures, but by noncompliance and evasion. If a government
wants to maintain the credibility of its anti-avoidance regime without
committing indefinite resources to enforcement, it should try to maximize
voluntary compliance. Rationalizing the rules for taxing indirect transfers
- including by mitigating the multiple taxation of the same economic gain
- is the most obvious strategy for increasing voluntary compliance.
B. The "Look-through " Approach: Basis Adjustments When Taxing
Indirect Transfers
China's policy for taxing indirect transfers under Circular 698 again
has suggested an alternative to the conventional "source" approach. This is
an inadvertent - and, as of yet, incompletely developed - consequence of
Circular 698's primary departure from the conventional approach discussed
in the last sub-part, namely its ex post determination of taxability. Under
current Chinese law, indirect transfers are not per se taxable. 0 8 What is per
se taxable is still the direct transfer of certain assets by nonresidents.10 9
Indirect transfers become taxable only after they have been determined by
107 Advanced income tax systems tend to aim to be neutral with respect to such choices
when the structures are domestic or "onshore," adopting special regimes such as corporate
consolidation and disregarding intra-group transactions.
1os Circular 698, supra note 4, 6.
109 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Suodeshui Fa Shishi Tiaoli (
k [Regulations on the Implementation of Enterprise Income Tax
Law] (promulgated by the St. Council Gaz., Dec. 6, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) art. 7
(China).
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tax authorities to be, in economic substance, direct transfers.110 Precisely
because there is currently no legal basis for taxing indirect transfers other
than the GAAR,1' the asset that is taxed when an indirect transfer is
subject to tax must of necessity be the underlying shares of a Chinese
resident company. In contrast to the "source" approach, layers of offshore
holding companies would not create separately and distinctly taxable assets
under Chinese law.
This approach has two minimal implications. First, if the shares of a
Chinese company are treated as having been disposed of indirectly through
the transfer of an offshore entity, the fact that the indirect transfer has been
subject to tax should be reflected by adjusting the tax cost or basis for the
Chinese company's shares. 112 For example, suppose that foreign investor S
forms an offshore company P with equity capital of 200. P in turn
contributes 200 of equity capital to Chinese company Q. When the value of
Q shares grows from the initial value of 200 to 250, S sells the shares of P
for 250 to buyer B. If China decides to disregard the existence of P to tax S
on the sale, and S is liable for tax on the gain of 50, then the tax basis or
cost of Q shares in the hands of P, and of B, should each be adjusted to 250.
If either P disposes Q shares now for 250 or B disposes of P shares for 250,
there should be no further tax for either P or B.
Second, since only the direct transfer of the shares of a Chinese
company is per se taxable (i.e., only the capital gain from such a transfer
has a source in China), Chinese tax authorities need to be able to disregard
not just the offshore entity whose shares are transferred but also any
intermediate offshore entity or entities between the directly transferred
offshore entity and "indirectly transferred" onshore entity. Thus, suppose
that in the above example, P invests in Chinese company Q indirectly
through another offshore company, P1. For China to tax S's transfer of P
shares under Circular 698, it must be able to disregard the existence not
only of P but also P1. Moreover, if P and P, are both disregarded, then the
transfers of shares of P, Pi, or Q should all result in an adjustment in the tax
basis for the shares of P, P1, and Q.
Let us call an approach that accepts the foregoing two implications
the "look-through" approach for taxing indirect transfers. Insofar as
Circular 698 follows this approach,1 3 China can be said to have found a
110 Circular 698, supra note 4,T 6.
11 See supra note 74-76 and accompanying text.
112 Keeping track of the tax basis or tax cost of an asset is a common device under most
income tax systems for ensuring that income associated with (and including capital gain
accruing to) the asset is taxed (and taxed only once).
113 Not all Chinese tax policymakers, administrators, or advisors have grasped these
implications. Since the adoption of Circular 698, parties have been more focused on when
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solution to many of the problems that arise under the "source" approach.
For example, the tax on an indirect transfer would always necessarily be
proportional under the "look-through" approach. The source country will
only get to tax any gain represented by the excess of (1) the portion of the
purchase price paid on the indirect transfer that is allocable to the shares of
the target company in the source country regarded as transferred indirectly,
over (2) the tax basis, for the source country's purposes, of such shares of
the target company. Moreover, by simultaneously making adjustments to
the tax cost or basis of the shares of the ultimate target company and the
shares of the "disregarded" entities above it (as illustrated by the simple
example above), the "look-through" approach can fundamentally eliminate
the possibility of taxing the same economic gain multiple times as a result
of multiple layers of indirect transfers.
In more technical terms, disregarding an offshore entity and taxing an
indirect transfer is essentially a matter of treating a sale of shares (of the
offshore entity) as a sale of underlying assets (i.e., the shares of a target
resident company). To implement this approach consistently may be quite
complex, and it has been argued that adjusting the tax basis of assets held
by an entity to reflect the transfers of interests in the entity by its owners (so
as to avoid multiple taxation of the same economic gain) is practically
infeasible for entities with many owners. 114 Yet if publicly listed entities are
excluded from a tax on indirect transfers so that most taxable indirect
transfers only involve entities with few owners, the complexity may be
manageable. A useful analogy is a type of rule available in several countries
that allows the seller and buyer in a merger and acquisition transaction to
elect to treat the sale and purchase of the shares of a corporation as the sale
and purchase of the corporation's assets. 115 There are various details to be
worked out to consistently implement this approach, including the proper
treatment of all of a disregarded entity's assets and liabilities. 116
The analogy shows also that disregarding offshore entities for purposes
of taxing an indirect transfer need not imply disregarding the entities for all
tax purposes. It is consistent with the "look-through" approach for taxing
indirect transfers that, for purposes other than determining whether or how
to tax an indirect transfer, the offshore holding companies are respected.
indirect transfers are taxable and not how.
114 See Weisbach, supra note 14, at 227.
115 In the United States, rules of this type can be found in section 338 of the Code. So-
called "check-the-box" entity classification elections can also have the effect of converting a
share sale into an asset sale. See Treas. Reg. § 1.338-4 (2001). Another analogy is the basis
adjustment of partnership assets under section 743 of the Code.
116 The rules on domestic deemed asset sales can serve as guides for designing similar
rules for taxable indirect transfers. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.338-4 (2001).
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Thus, in the above simple example, a regular dividend or an interest
payment from Q to P may still be respected as such (instead of being
treated as a payment to P's shareholders) and the source country may
impose a withholding tax with respect to P on such payments. "7
C. An Ex Ante Look-through Approach
As discussed above, the look-through approach implicit in China's
Circular 698 is a result of tax authorities applying anti-avoidance standards
to particular transactions. The discretion to apply the look-through method
rests not with the taxpayer - this is an important dis-analogy with rules
allowing taxpayers' elections to treat share sales as asset sales found in
various income tax systems. In Part IV, however, I argued that it may be
desirable for countries like China to develop some ex ante rules for taxing
indirect transfers (just as it may be desirable for other countries to narrow
the scope of their current ex ante rules but to maintain the strength of their
anti-avoidance policy by reserving the power to make ex post
determinations). If taxpayers can self-assess the taxability of some indirect
transfers on the basis of such ex ante rules and if the tax on an indirect
transfer is still implemented through a look-through approach, a new type
of design for taxing indirect transfers emerges.
The following table shows four policy options that result from the
different ways of combining the choice between using ex ante and ex post
rules with the choice to adopt a source or look-through approach. The
conventional approach and that of China's Circular 698 represent two of the
possible combinations. Each of the possibilities can be assessed in terms of:
(1) whether the policy is well targeted at tax avoidance behavior; (2)
whether the policy solves the problem of arbitrary and multiple taxation;
and (3) whether the policy is too unpredictable, costly to implement, and
generative of perverse incentives for tax avoidance. The conventional
approach falls short on criteria (1) and (2), while China's approach can be
faulted under (3). The most attractive combination, which would do well
under all three criteria, is the ex ante look-through approach in the lower
left quadrant,"l8 provided that well-targeted safe harbours and specific anti-
117 For a further discussion of this point, including an argument that a disregarded entity
for purposes of Circular 698 may still be respected as a taxpayer eligible for treaty benefits,
see Wei Cui, Taxing Indirect Transfers: Rules and Doctrines, in TAXATION OF COMPANIES
ON CAPITAL GAINS ON SHARES UNDER DOMESTIC LAw, EU LAW AND TAX TREATIES, supra
note 64.
118 More precisely, the most attractive combination would lie between the upper left
and lower left quadrants, since a combination of ex ante rules and ex post standards is
recommended.
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avoidance rules can be designed and ex post standards are deployed only to
serve as a backup.
TABLE 1. POSSIBLE APPROACHES OF TAXING DIRECT TRANSFERS.
Look-through Source-based
Ex post, anti- China Circular 698.119 Not yet adopted.
avoidance-based rule
requiring tax authority
intervention
Ex ante rule allowing Not yet adopted. The conventional approach,
taxpayer self- adopted by Canada,
assessment Australia, Japan, et cetera,
with respect to real property,
and India, Peru, et cetera,
with respect to resident
company shares.
At the present, no country yet has appears to have adopted - or even
publicly considered - the option corresponding to the lower left quadrant.
The merits of this option may be worth considering regardless of whether a
country's policy of taxing indirect transfers is targeted at only real estate
ownership or at foreign investment more generally. The payoff for making
the improvements implied by the option will be greater, of course, the more
frequently the relevant types of indirect transfers would otherwise tend to
occur. As suggested in Part I, however, to give momentum to any reform
proposal, two fundamental questions need to be addressed. One is how to
secure compliance with a policy of taxing indirect transfers. The other is
why taxing indirect transfers can be a good idea for some countries even if
most other countries (especially OECD countries that traditionally set
international tax norms) do not do so. The remaining two parts of this
article address these two questions in turn.
VI. SECURING COMPLIANCE WITH THE TAx ON INDIRECT TRANSFERS
Securing compliance from nonresident taxpayers can be challenging
when the taxable transactions and the flow of funds all take place outside
the source country - which is frequently the case for indirect transfers.
Such factual configurations are often present even for taxable direct
transfers of the shares of resident companies by nonresidents, and the
difficulties they pose for taxing capital gain on direct transfers, at least for
limited and well-targeted asset classes and transactions (e.g., FIRPTA
119 Circular 698 only suggests this combination of the approaches but does not work it
out in detail. See Circular 698, supra note 4.
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assets in the United States), 120 are not regarded as insurmountable. What
new problems of compliance arise for the new, more expansive efforts by
India, China, and others to tax indirect transfers of a greater range of assets?
In this part I examine that question, with a particular focus on how the
rationalization of existing practices for taxing indirect transfers proposed in
Part V.C might affect compliance.
A. Traditional Issues in Securing Compliance
Conceptually, there are three legal mechanisms that enable tax
authorities to detect offshore (direct or indirect) share transfers: (1)
reporting and self-assessment by the transferor; (2) mere reporting without
withholding by the transferee (or third parties); and (3) withholding by the
transferee. Each of these mechanisms can operate on the basis of both
explicit sanctions and implicit economic incentives.
The first mechanism, the reporting of a taxable transfer by the
transferor, is the most basic mechanism for producing detection. At the
present, Australia, Japan, and China rely on this method exclusively in their
policy of taxing indirect transfers.121 To foster compliance, the source
country may impose penalties on nonreporting transferors. Nonetheless, if
the chances of detection of taxable transactions are otherwise very low, the
expected cost of a penalty for nonreporting may also be too low to be
effective. If most taxpayers do not comply and the tax authority fails to
detect most instances of noncompliance, imposing a heavy penalty on the
few detected cases will also seem unfair. Finally, if the compliance decision
is only at the private discretion of taxpayers, the perception of widespread
noncompliance may easily develop, regardless of the actual level of
compliance.
The stagnation of the idea of taxing indirect transfers is probably
attributable in part to the weakness of seller reporting and the questions that
it leaves unanswered. How does one know what percentage of taxpayers are
complying (even in Japan and Australia)?l 22 Before moving on to the
conclusion that legally mandated transferee reporting or withholding is
necessary, however, we should consider two factors that could alleviate the
tax authority's predicament under the transferor-reporting regime. First,
when taxing the capital gain realized on direct or indirect share transfers,
120 See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
121 For Australia and Japan, see supra notes 66-69. For China, see supra notes 73-80
and accompanying text.
122 For practicing tax advisors, not knowing the actual level of compliance is reflected
in experiences such as receiving calls from clients about the taxability of indirect transfers
and never hearing back again.
2014] 689
Virginia Tax Review
the source country generally needs to keep track of the tax cost or basis of
the shares transferred (of either domestic or foreign entities). If the capital
gain realized on a transfer has been subject to tax, the basis of the shares
transferred should be stepped up for purposes of future source country
taxation. 123 Conversely, one can imagine a rule providing that if a transfer
has not been taxed (other than in a case where the capital gain on a transfer
is positively exempted from tax, for example, under an applicable treaty),
then the basis of the transferred shares would, for the purpose of source
country taxation, remain what it had been. That is, the transferee would not
obtain a basis in the shares it acquires equal to the consideration it pays
unless the acquisition has been taxed. It does not appear that Japan,
Australia, or China has explicitly adopted such a rule in their statutes or
written guidance.124 Nonetheless, any silence of the law on such matter and
the possibility of tax authorities to take such a position in practice may
constitute a sufficient threat.125 With such a rule in place, the failure to
report a taxable transfer would result in the risk that the transferee, in the
future when it acts as a transferor, would be taxed on gain that accrued to
and was realized by previous owners.
Of course, the future transfer itself will be reported or detected. That
future transfer may itself be exempt from tax (e.g., under treaty protection).
Both the tax authority and the nonresident taxpayer may have difficulty
determining what the original basis of the shares of a foreign entity was in
the hands of previous owners. Nonetheless, the risk of the conversion of a
seller tax liability into a potential tax liability of the buyer (as a future
seller) may well be unacceptable to many buyers. They would then either
seek indemnity from the seller or require, as a matter of contract, the seller
to report the sale to the tax authorities 126 and, in addition, to pay the tax on
it if required by law.
A second type of market dynamic that increases compliance has to do
with legal and tax advisors. Taxing indirect transfers expands the
jurisdiction of the legal system of the source country, and one would expect
that advisors in such a country stand to gain, to varying degrees, from such
expansion. Even a system of compliance that relies only on transferor self-
reporting and sanctions for nonreporting creates legal risks for transferors,
some of whom will consequently want to consult advisors to assess such
123 See discussion supra Part V.B.
124 See generally sources cited supra notes 4, 64, 68.
125 Part VI.B infra recommends explicitly adopting this approach in combination with
the look-through approach.
126 The report of an indirect transfer by a seller will at least put tax authorities on alert
as to the new owner. This, however, does not necessarily mean increased chances of future
transfers being detected.
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risk. If the rules for taxing indirect transfers are robust, then the advisors
should generally be better off, or at least be no worse off, by advising
compliance compared to advising noncompliance. If rules for taxing
indirect transfers contain loopholes or are too weak, advisors may benefit
from counseling clients to exploit such loopholes and weaknesses, and
advice for such exploitation would always be more lucrative, the higher the
compliance bar is raised.
Because the penalties for nonreporting under Circular 698 are very
low, 127 most compliance with the circular that has taken place in China
since 2009 likely has been based on the two market mechanisms just
described. This reminds us that the transferor/taxpayer's game regarding the
source country tax authority is typically played out not in isolation, but in
the company of both buyers and advisors. The effect of implicit economic
incentives for tax compliance (as opposed to explicit sanctions) has other
examples in tax design. For example, under European value added tax
(VAT) law, non-European providers of services to European customers are
required to register in a European country in order to pay VAT chargeable
on the services. 128 The failure to register is penalized. 129 The real downside
to not registering, however, has been said not to be the penalty per se, but
being penalized for a cost that one could have charged to the customer. 130
Consider now what the requirement of transferee reporting adds to this
mixture of incentives. First, assuming that the transferee is a nonresident as
well, the failure of transferee reporting would be just as hard to detect as the
failure of transferor reporting. Any sanction imposed upon a transferee's
failure to report a taxable indirect transfer would be similar to increasing the
penalties on a transferor's failure to report - in both cases, the aggregate
penalties on nonreporting are increased. The difference is that the transferee
usually has nothing to lose by reporting, since it is not the party paying the
tax. This may be sufficient to create compliance by transferees.131
Interestingly, however, no government seems to have instituted transferee
127 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shuishou Zhengshou Guanli Fa
(E [Law on the Administration of Tax Collection]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'1 People's Cong., Sept. 4, 1992, effective Jan. 1,
1993) art. 62 (China); Cui, supra note 80, at 1077-78.
128 See Howard Lambert, VAT and Electronic Commerce: European Union Insights
into the Challenges Ahead, 17 TAx NOTES INT'L 1645, 1646 (Nov. 23, 1998).
129 Id. at 1651.
130 Id. at 1653.
131 It should be noted that this is a distinct incentive from the implicit economic
incentive above produced by the mechanism of basis adjustment: presumably, government
would not regard the mere reporting of the taxable transaction as sufficient for the basis of
the transferred shares to be stepped up in the hands of the transferee.
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reporting alone (without further requiring withholding) for taxing either
direct or indirect transfers. This might be seen as pointing to the perceived
magnitude of the enforcement problem: simply having information that
some foreigner engaged in a taxable transaction is of little value, and the
government still has to do everything to collect the tax.
Transferee withholding is clearly a more powerful tool for enforcement
than transferee reporting. The United States, Canada, and India each
requires the transferee in a taxable direct (and, in the case of India and
Canada, indirect) transfer to withhold from gross proceeds paid to the
transferor. 132 Each also makes the amount required to be withheld the
personal tax liability of the transferee if the transferee fails to withhold.
Note, however, that if the transferee is a nonresident, the imposition of a
withholding obligation alone does not necessarily enhance the transferee's
likelihood of compliance. Moreover, withholding on capital gain also
cannot be expected to be accurate with respect to the ultimate tax liability
and therefore will likely trigger either an application for refund or the tax
authority's examination. Any obligation to withhold thus can only be
sensibly formulated as with respect to the gross amount paid and not the
capital gain realized by the payee. 133 Finally, note that when the transferee
is made personally liable for failing to withhold a tax that was in the first
instance imposed on the transferor, one has merely made the implicit
penalty of the no-basis-step-up treatment (which is possible even under
transferor reporting) explicit.
The foregoing review shows that when direct or indirect share transfers
occur among nonresidents, even withholding, the most powerful tool for
securing compliance, differs from voluntary transferor reporting only
marginally. An important corollary of this is that overall enforcement
improves with voluntary compliance. The table below compares the various
possible incentives that may attach to the three mechanisms for procuring
compliance:
132 The United States rule requires withholding of ten percent from gross proceeds.
I.R.C. § 1445. The Canadian rule requires a significantly higher (twenty-five percent) rate of
withholding, but allows the transferor to prepay or post collateral with the government based
on the amount of capital gain. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1, § 116 (Can.). The Indian
rule requires withholding simply of the amount of the tax owed, without addressing the issue
of how the transferee would know how much tax is owed. The Income Tax Act, No. 43 of
1961, INDIA CODE § 195(1) (1993).
133 It is only infrequently that a seller would tell a buyer how much profit the seller has
made. But see The Income Tax Act, § 195(1) ("Any person responsible for paying to a non-
resident . . . any interest . . . or any other sum chargeable under the provisions of this Act ...
shall, at the time of credit of such income to the account of the payee or at the time of
payment thereof.. . deduct income-tax thereon at the rates in force .... ).
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TABLE 2. A COMPARISON OF ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS FOR TAXING
INDIRECT TRANSFERS.1 34
Transferor Transferee Transferee
reporting information withholding
reporting
Penalties for V / V
transferor
nonreporting
Implicit penalty on V X35
transferee of no basis
step up
Penalties on X / J
transferee
nonreporting
Revenue protection X X V
Accurate V X X
determination of tax
liability
Advisor preferences V V V
for reporting
B. Effects on Compliance of Reformed Rules
The proposed improvements to existing practices of taxing indirect
transfers discussed in Part V.C above impact compliance in two ways. One
proposed change is either to introduce or to retain certain powers for tax
authorities to make ex post determinations about the taxability of indirect
transfers. This would allow tax authorities to be more comfortable in
narrowing the scope of their ex ante rules, which in turn could produce
better compliance by targeting tax avoidance more accurately. The
compatibility of the ex post component with some traditional compliance
mechanisms may be questionable, however. If an indirect transfer is taxable
only as the result of an ex post determination by the tax authority (e.g., that
the transferred entity lacks sufficient economic substance), until the tax
authority makes such a determination, the nonresident transferor may have
merely derived foreign source income. The imposition of a reporting
requirement on either transferors or transferees would involve the source
country's assertion of jurisdiction over transactions that may well be not
taxable. This may seem unusual,136 and the tension becomes greater when
134 Check marks represent the presence of a feature, whereas cross marks represent its
absence.
135 Assuming transferee is made liable for failure to withhold.
36 What is a country doing by threatening or imposing sanctions on the failure to report
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withholding is at stake: if a transaction has not been determined to be
taxable, could a tax authority really take revenue protection measures
requiring transferees to withhold and remit? The adoption of an ex post
approach to taxing indirect transfers thus seems to have a mixed effect on
compliance: while it should increase compliance by better targeting
avoidance behavior, it might decrease compliance by weakening some of
the tax authorities' deterrence tools.
A solution to this problem is to require transferee withholding on
transactions that are not excluded from the tax base under ex ante rules
(e.g., safe harbors for listed companies), and to allow a refund of the
withheld tax for those transactions that are determined, ex post, to be
nontaxable. For this to work, the ex post determination must be made by a
neutral party, otherwise the temptation for the tax authority to make
determinations that allow it to keep funds collected may be (perceived to
be) too great. No analogue for this mechanism under any existing institution
of tax administration has been found, however, and it is uncertain that it
would work.
Nonetheless, the discussion earlier in this part suggested that even
when no withholding is required, one should not overestimate the
deterrence effect of explicit legal sanctions nor underestimate the effect of
market dynamics (e.g., transferees' and tax advisors' spontaneous
enforcement) or implicit penalties (e.g., not allowing basis step up for
nonreported transfers) for producing compliance. This is where the second
proposed improvement to existing practices of taxing indirect transfers can
make a substantial difference. Part V showed that by applying the look-
through method to taxable indirect transfers, one can avoid multiple
taxation on the same economic gain as well as other arbitrary consequences
of the source approach. Such rationalizing of the consequences of a tax on
indirect transfers may improve compliance incentives for all,137 but it may
especially accentuate the economic incentive of buyers/transferees to
require the reporting of an indirect transfer.
This is so for several reasons. To begin, it is especially natural under
the look-through approach to explicitly adopt the rule that unless an indirect
transfer has been subject to tax, the cost basis of the target resident
company's shares (i.e., what are regarded as the assets actually transferred
under the look-through approach) would not be adjusted. The look-through
treatment of offshore entities would not apply generally (e.g., it would not
apply to dividend, interest, or royalty payments made to offshore entities),
transactions that may not be taxable anyway?
137 For example, the intrinsic complexity of the look-through approach may be favored
by tax advisors.
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but is adopted only for determining the amount of gain in a taxable indirect
transfer. The parties to the transfer can thus be viewed as having an
affirmative duty to follow the procedures for reporting indirect transfers and
computing associated tax liabilities. It seems perfectly fair that if such
procedures are not followed, the look-through treatment would not apply.
Moreover, very often, when indirect transfers are carried out, there is no
change of direct ownership of the target resident company. It is thus
generally easy to identify the original cost basis of the target company's
shares. 138 Therefore, the market-based penalty for making transferees
implicitly liable for any tax that the transferors failed to pay can be
especially effective under the look-through approach.
The "upside" to compliance is also magnified for the buyer under the
look-through approach. This is because the source country would allow the
imposition of tax to lead to the adjustment in basis of all offshore assets
(e.g., shares of each holding company among layers of holding companies),
the values of which are attributable to the ultimate target company shares.
The buyer would thus be assured that, whatever indirect transfers it makes
in the future, it would be taxed on only any further capital gain that has
accrued to the target company in the source country.
VII. BEYOND ANTI-TAX-AVOIDANCE
Part III suggested that indirect transfers as a tax-planning technique
may be complementary to the choice of offshore markets and offshore
investment structures. Where there is little demand for such structures and
where the offshore market of sales and purchases does not really exist, as
seems to be the case with respect to U.S. real estate, tax avoidance via
indirect transfers simply is not a concern. Conversely, the jurisdictions in
which indirect transfers may appear to be commercially appealing ways of
avoiding taxes are often precisely jurisdictions with respect to which active
offshore markets have emerged for nontax reasons. Sometimes, such
offshore markets exist despite the important attractions offered by the
economy in these jurisdictions, e.g., a large population of domestic
investors.' 39 Regulatory restrictions (including those on the practice of law)
and resulting market incentives have separated the onshore and offshore
markets, with tax avoidance both fueling and benefiting from the offshore
markets. 140
1 By contrast, as pointed out earlier, it may be difficult for taxpayers and tax
authorities to identify the cost basis of transferred shares in the hands of previous owners.
139 See supra Part III (discussing China).
140 See supra Part III.
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In economic theories of taxation, it is well known that one way of
taxing something that is hard to tax directly is to tax its complement. 141
Taxing indirect transfers, therefore, could be a way of taxing the use of
offshore structures and offshore markets - if the latter effect is desired.
Are there reasons why governments would want to impose a tax on
transactions carried out in offshore markets with respect to investments in
their own countries? A positive answer to this question would imply that
taxing indirect transfers can have policy significance beyond combatting tax
avoidance.
Such reasons indeed seem to exist. We can think of the use of offshore
legal systems (e.g., the corporate laws of the Cayman Islands, the Virgin
Islands, et cetera) as a substitute for engaging with onshore legal
mechanisms in a country with a real economy as a form of the erosion of
the "market base" for the country's legal system. Legal systems do not
simply come out of nowhere. The public costs - financed by taxes and
user fees - associated with legislation and the administration of justice are
worth expending only when people make use of the legal system and incur
private costs associated with seeking legal advice, contracting, litigating, et
cetera. In other words, sufficient economic justification for a society to
undertake legislation, adjudication, and other activities that develop the law
exists only when there is sufficient social demand for the law.142 When
commercial transactions are driven or diverted away from the places where
real economic activities occur, this market base for affording the cost of
developing law is eroded. This, of course, may in part be the fault of the
inefficiencies of the legal and regulatory systems of the countries where the
economic activities take or would have taken place. Nonetheless, the fact
that economic actors naturally want to avoid inefficient legal systems does
not mean that their "opting out" of such systems is not problematic for the
countries and other economic actors that must rely on such systems.
There are numerous analogies between the idea of the erosion of a
market base for law and the idea of tax base erosion. We ordinarily refer to
the economic activities - and the result of economic activities, such as
income and wealth - to which taxes apply as the tax base. The revenue
generated from taxing such activities supports government expenditures.
The instruments of taxation and their administration, as well as the ways in
141 The most important application of this idea in tax design is to tax goods that are
complementary to leisure, since the taxation of work but not of leisure generates the most
fundamental and substantial type of economic distortion among all economic distortions
produced by taxation. See, e.g., W.J. Corlett & D.C. Hague, Complementarity and the Excess
Burden of Taxation, 21 REv. EcONSTUD. 21, 21, 26 (1953).
142 See Mulligan & Shleifer, supra note 60 (noting that legal systems develop as a
function of "the extent of the market").
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which public revenue is spent, can be efficient or inefficient. By analogy,
we may call the market base for a legal system the "legal base." The costs
of engaging with the legal system can be analogized to the tax collected by
the government, and benefits offered by a legal system can be analogized to
the benefits of public spending funded by tax revenue. The combined costs
and rewards of a legal system can also be evaluated as efficient or
inefficient.
While many relatively immobile economic activities must engage with
both the tax/spending and legal systems in the country in which they are
situated, mobile economic activities can pick and choose. Mobile economic
activities (e.g., transactions in capital) tend to migrate away from high-tax
jurisdictions either if the mix of spending and taxes is unsatisfactory or if
such activities can avoid taxes but at the same time benefit from the markets
(supported in part by public spending) of the countries that impose such
taxes. The latter constitutes erosion of the tax base. 143 Similarly, market
activities that engage directly with the economy of a country but that opt
out of that country's legal regime - through the use of offshore investment
structures, international commercial arbitration as opposed to domestic
dispute resolution, and so on - can be said to erode the legal base of the
country. The tax havens that mobile economic activities migrate to tend to
offer the combination of low or no tax and little government spending. 144
Similarly, for the offshore legal advisors of the world, 145 structuring
transactions often may involve choosing the simplest, not the best (in terms
of, e.g., versatility, predictability, and inherent rationality) set of legal rules
to apply. 146
Tax and legal base erosion are not only analogous but often
complementary. This has been amply illustrated in China, during the initial
143 See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEv., ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND
PROFIT SHIFTING 17 (2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf.
144 See James R. Hines, Jr., Do Tax Havens Flourish?, 19 TAX Pot'Y & ECON. 65
(2005) (observing that government size in tax havens appears to be close to the world's
average, but smaller countries ought to have larger governments relative to the size of the
economy).
145 I mean here not just, or even primarily, the legal advisors from the Cayman Islands,
Bermuda, the Virgin Islands, Jersey, et cetera. Instead, it is the law firms from advanced
legal systems, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, that do businesses in other
countries but that are not (or that are insufficiently) rewarded commercially (sometimes
because they are prohibited from being rewarded) by the development of the legal systems in
these other countries.
146 When disputes actually arise, it is the legal systems of real economies - courts and
arbitral bodies in Europe and North America - that are requested to apply their
jurisprudence and legal tradition to resolve the disputes.
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years of the implementation of Circular 698.147 The resources devoted to
enforcing Circular 698 by Chinese tax agencies, and the revenue
consequently collected, are still low relative to the high frequency and value
of indirect transfers with respect to Chinese investments. 148 Nonetheless, it
has not only caught the attention of all Chinese tax advisors, but has also
become perhaps the most widely-known aspect of Chinese tax law among
legal advisors working on investments into China. Lawyers who otherwise
have negligible interest in Chinese taxation have compared Circular 698 to
some of the most prominent Chinese regulatory measures targeted at the use
of offshore structures. 149 Up until now, partly because Circular 698 is too
weak,150 it may simply have generated higher (and socially wasteful) costs
for offshore transactions but not reduced their volume. Nonetheless, if
better enforcement is achieved (both as a result of better rule design and the
dedication of real resources), it may actually fulfill the prophecy made by
some that the circular would "usher[] in a new era in the China cross-border
transactional landscape."'51
Putting the tax on indirect transfers in this greater context allows us to
appreciate the potential of this policy tool to generate social benefits beyond
reducing tax avoidance. Better enforcement of the tax on indirect transfers
will likely increase the cost of using, and therefore eventually reduce
demand for, offshore transaction structures. Very often, this will not mean
that deals cannot be struck and commerce will be blocked. Instead, it may
mean only that the paths of least resistance are not available (and that the
subpopulation of offshore legal and tax advisors do less well). Market
resources may then instead be devoted to supporting the development of
more sophisticated legal systems in the target jurisdictions.
There are other potential benefits to the policy of taxing indirect
transfers as well. One benefit has to do with the complexity and opacity of
offshore group structures of multinational companies, which has recently
147 For a discussion of Circular 698, see supra Parts IV and V.
148 Income tax revenue collected from nonresidents on all capital gains (i.e., not just on
the indirect transfer of the shares of resident companies) amounted to Y6.85 billion
(approximately U.S. $1.1 billion). Non-resident Corporate Tax Roll in 2012 Maintained
Moderate Growth, CHINA TAX'N NEWS (Feb. 18, 2013), available at http://www.chinatax.
gov.cn/n2925/n2953/c307726/content.html.
149 See, e.g., Clients and Friends Memo: Circular 698: The China's Anti-tax Avoidance
Measures for Offshore SPVs, CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP, at 1 (Aug. 23,
2010), http://www.cadwalader.com/CN/assets/client_friend/CWTC&FMemoSAFECir698
%29.pdf (claiming that Circular 698 "represents the most recent challenge for offshore
holding companies or special purpose vehicle . . . structures in the [People's Republic of
China].").
150 See discussion supra Part IV.
151 Clients and Friends Memo, supra note 149, at 1.
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generated much controversy. 152 These structures are essentially premised
on the absence of tax "frictions" in multiple tiers of offshore holding
companies. When a tax on indirect transfers is imposed, the offshore
structures are no longer frictionless, and tax enforcement can throw a good
amount of light on such offshore structures. This is not to say that countries
that do no tax capital gains realized by foreign investors should tax indirect
transfers merely so as to obtain information about offshore structures, but
only that those that do tax indirect transfers would already have a natural
way of obtaining such information - one example of an ancillary benefit
from such a tax regime.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Tax policy instruments, if they are well designed for the puprose they
intend to achieve, do not have to be widely adopted by many countries to
obtain legitimacy. The problem with the policy of taxing foreigners on
indirect transfers of domestic assets and the shares of domestic companies
is that its purpose has heretofore not been well articulated (e.g., why should
the policy be limited to taxing profits from real estate?); nor have the rules
adopted to implement it been well-designed. Thus, even though the policy
is recommended with respect to cross-border real estate investments by
several model tax conventions, and even though numerous OECD countries
have adopted such a policy, as soon as other countries have tried to expand
its scope, it has fallen into controversy.
Reflecting on when the type of avoidance taxing indirect transfers
targets is relevant reveals the tax's purpose. It appears that indirect transfers
would constitute a realistic way of avoiding a tax on direct transfers only if
there is an active offshore market where foreign investments into the source
country are traded. In countries like India, China, and many non-OECD
countries, there are systematic reasons why such offshore markets would
develop that may not be present in OECD countries. In those contexts,
taxing indirect transfers may be not only necessary to combat tax
avoidance, but also beneficial in addressing negative externalities of
offshore markets, such as the erosion of the economic base of the legal
system of the source country. The policy possesses a vitality that could not
be inferred from aged formulas of model tax conventions.
The single most important criterion for evaluating the design of rules
for taxing indirect transfers is the likelihood of compliance. Unfortunately,
very little is known about the degree of compliance countries have been
152 Edward D. Kleinbard, Through a Latte, Darkly: Starbucks' Stateless Income Tax
Planning, 139 TAx NOTES 1515, 1521 (June 24, 2013); see also ORG. FOR ECON.
COOPERATION & DEv., supra note 143, at 22.
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able to achieve with respect to their rules on taxable indirect transfers.
Several ways of redesigning the tax - which would require significant
legislative changes in all relevant countries, old hands and newcomers alike
- that would improve compliance exist. These changes are worth
considering not because they lead to conceptually pleasing results, but
because they are likely to affect real incentives in compliance.
